Incrementalism, Comprehensive Rationality, and the Future of Gun Control by Rostron, Allen
Maryland Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 3 Article 3
Incrementalism, Comprehensive Rationality, and
the Future of Gun Control
Allen Rostron
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Second Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Allen Rostron, Incrementalism, Comprehensive Rationality, and the Future of Gun Control, 67 Md. L. Rev. 511 (2008)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol67/iss3/3
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 1 28-APR-08 7:13
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 67 2008 NUMBER 3
 Copyright Maryland Law Review 2008
Articles
INCREMENTALISM, COMPREHENSIVE RATIONALITY, AND
THE FUTURE OF GUN CONTROL
ALLEN ROSTRON*
I. INTRODUCTION
“What good is half an eye?”  That question has become a familiar
refrain in the creation/evolution debate.1  Proponents of “intelligent
design” and other creationist theories contend that certain complex
structures, such as eyes, could not have emerged gradually through
evolution because they contain many parts that must work together to
accomplish their function.2  If not fully assembled, they do not work at
all.  Half an eye thus provides no survival advantage, and therefore the
trait could not have proliferated and improved through natural selec-
tion.  Eyes must then have been created as complete units, in one fell
swoop, rather than through a gradual step-by-step process.
Copyright  2008 by Allen Rostron.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri–Kansas City School of Law.  B.A.,
University of Virginia; J.D., Yale Law School.  Thanks to Nancy Levit for helpful comments
and criticism, and to Elizabeth Dillinger for excellent research assistance.  The UMKC Law
Foundation generously supported this research.  The author formerly worked as a senior
staff attorney for the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence.  The views expressed in this
Article are strictly his own and do not represent the positions of any other person or entity.
1. E.g., Chet K. W. Pager, The Establishment of Evolution: Public Courts and Public Class-
rooms, 81 TUL. L. REV. 17, 48–49 (2006) (noting that Charles Darwin raised the question as
a possible critique of his theory of evolution).
2. E.g., MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN’S BLACK BOX: THE BIOCHEMICAL CHALLENGE TO
EVOLUTION 15–17 (1996) (contending that gradual development of the eye was impossible
because of its sophisticated, interdependent features).
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Others hotly dispute those assertions.  Evolutionists insist that
half an eye could be very valuable.3  They describe how eyes could
have evolved gradually, starting from a crude cluster of a few photo-
sensitive cells capable of distinguishing light from dark, with each
small, subsequent change providing a slight improvement in percep-
tion and a corresponding selective advantage.4
This conflict about what can be accomplished through a series of
many small, incremental changes, versus a single comprehensive plan,
has close parallels in the realm of policymaking.  Decision and organi-
zation theorists have described two basic models of the process by
which creation of public policy may proceed.  Some urge that policy
should be the product of comprehensive, rational analysis and design.
Policymakers should identify objectives, imagine all possible means of
pursuing those goals, consider the effectiveness of each alternative ap-
proach, and then adopt the set of policies that will produce the best
results.  Others contend that policymaking should be a more evolu-
tionary process, with policy emerging gradually in small, incremental
steps through a continual cycle of experimentation, reaction, and
adjustment.
This Article examines the issue of gun control through the lens of
the “comprehensive rationality” and “incrementalism” models of poli-
cymaking.  Fierce debate surrounds gun control in the United States,
making it not only a major dividing issue in legislative arenas and po-
litical races but also a key element in a wider cultural divide.5  The
nation has been locked for years in a bitter, dismal stalemate on this
issue, with no one seeming to be happy with the status quo, but little
significant change being made in any direction.6
3. See John Rennie, 15 Answers to Creationist Nonsense, SCI. AM., July 2002, at 78 (noting
that Darwin believed “even ‘incomplete’ eyes might confer benefits”).
4. See, e.g., Dan-E. Nilsson & Susanne Pelger, A Pessimistic Estimate of the Time Required
for an Eye to Evolve, 256 PROC.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 53, 53 (1994) (explaining that eyes could
have evolved from preexisting tissues in a few hundred thousand generations).  Charles
Darwin himself anticipated the “half an eye” debate and concluded that eyes could have
evolved through natural selection. CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 190 (Charles
W. Eliot ed., P.F. Collier & Son 1909) (1859).
5. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1323 (2003) (discussing the conflict-
ing cultural values at stake in the gun control debate); Matt Bai, Nascar-Lovin, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 94 (noting the political importance of the NRA and gun
control policy); William Safire, Guns, God and Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 20 (describing political candidates’ polarizing, tactical use of the gun control
issue).
6. See, e.g., James P. Pinkerton, America’s Violence Can Hurt Both Parties, NEWSDAY (New
York), Oct. 9, 2002, at A45 (lamenting that gun control is a “problem that no politician, or
even pundit, seems able to solve,” and that a stalemate exists between “anti-gun-control
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This Article argues that incremental policymaking has been one
of the major impediments to progress toward more effective regula-
tion of guns.  This country’s gun laws are an often incoherent patch-
work of provisions.  Legislators pile new restrictions atop old ones,
often in response to particular tragedies or narrow concerns, instead
of crafting bills to achieve an optimal approach to the entire problem.
These laws contain unjustifiable gaps because policymakers draw odd
lines between different types of guns, between licensed gun dealers
and unlicensed individuals, between foreign and domestic sources of
guns, and between state and federal government responsibilities.  Gun
control has been handled in a crudely instrumentalist manner, but it
is an issue with a special need for a far more comprehensive approach.
The limited effectiveness of the incrementalist approach to gun
control issues can be seen in three of the most controversial episodes
relating to gun policymaking in recent years: the uproar over police
seizing citizens’ guns in the New Orleans area in the aftermath of Hur-
ricane Katrina,7 litigation about whether several portions of the Dis-
trict of Columbia’s strict gun laws violate the U.S. Constitution’s
Second Amendment,8 and the mass shooting at the Virginia Tech
campus.9  Each vividly demonstrates the problems created by incre-
mentalist approaches to gun control policy.  Each involved legislators
banning or heavily restricting guns in a special zone.  In a nation
awash with millions of guns subject to inadequate controls, the flow of
weapons from other areas substantially undermines these efforts,
whether the “gun-free zone” is a flood-ravaged region, the nation’s
capital city, or a college campus.  Meanwhile, reasonable precautions
such as background-check requirements are undercut because legisla-
tors do not apply them broadly and consistently.  The ease with which
the Virginia Tech shooter obtained a gun, despite the fact that a judge
had previously declared him mentally ill and ordered treatment, is a
tragic testament to the insufficiency of the scattershot nature of ex-
isting law.10
Political science and other social science literature has closely ex-
amined the “incrementalism” and “comprehensive rationality” models
of policymaking over the past several decades,11 but legal scholars dis-
Republicans [who] hold sway in their ‘red states,’ while pro-gun-control Democrats rule in
‘blue states’”).
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 401 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007); see infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 270–281. R
11. See infra text accompanying notes 13, 30–34. R
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cuss the models much less frequently.  This Article takes an important
step toward drawing policymaking theory developed in other disci-
plines into legal analysis.  In doing so, this Article sheds new light on
the gun control issue, one of the nation’s most intractable dilemmas,
and proposes a significant change in perspective that challenges gun
control proponents and opponents alike to reassess their stances on
what measures are likely to be productive or ineffective.
Part II of this Article describes in more detail the “incremental-
ism” and “comprehensive rationality” models of public policymaking,
focusing on how political scientists have identified a few exceptional
types of policy problems that are particularly unsuited for an incre-
mentalist approach.  Part III describes three recent, major controver-
sies in the gun control field—the dispute over guns in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina, the fight over gun laws in the District of Colum-
bia, and the massacre of over thirty students and teachers at Virginia
Tech—and explains how they reflect the deeply incrementalist pat-
terns of gun control policymaking in the United States.  Part IV ties
together the common strands of these controversies and suggests that
incremental policymaking poses a special risk for firearm regulation
because of the uniquely prominent role that “slippery slope” fears play
in the opposition to any new measures concerning guns.  This Article
contends that a more comprehensive approach is vital both to achieve
more effective policies and to quell gun owners’ concerns that moder-
ate gun control measures will eventually lead to gun bans and confis-
cation.  Finally, this Article contends that the top policy priority
should be expanding background check regulations to form a more
complete and coherent system limiting access to guns.12
II. INCREMENTALISM AND COMPREHENSIVE RATIONALITY
Charles Lindblom, a political scientist at Yale, did the seminal
work on incremental modes of policy decisionmaking.13  Before him,
12. In the interests of full disclosure, I emphasize that I am not an impartial observer of
gun control matters, having worked as a lawyer for an organization that supports gun con-
trol.  The quality of the debate over guns and policies concerning them can improve only if
everyone, including those with the strongest leanings in one direction or the other, sin-
cerely attempts to assess the issues as rigorously and fairly as possible.
13. See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79,
80–81 (1959).  Lindblom expanded on these ideas in a number of later works. See, e.g.,
DAVID BRAYBROOKE & CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY EVALUATION
AS A SOCIAL PROCESS (1963); CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY: DE-
CISION MAKING THROUGH MUTUAL ADJUSTMENT (1965); CHARLES E. LINDBLOM & EDWARD J.
WOODHOUSE, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS (3d ed. 1993); Charles E. Lindblom, Still Mud-
dling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517, 517 (1979).
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the classic vision of policymaking featured legislators or regulators
methodically attempting to come up with the single best, complete
approach to a problem.  They would begin by identifying all relevant
objectives, ranking their importance, and then identifying all conceiv-
able actions that could be taken in pursuit of those objectives.  Next,
they would systematically compare every one of the policy alternatives,
decide which best achieved the objectives, and implement the chosen
policy.14
Lindblom questioned this classic model of “comprehensive ra-
tionality,” or “synoptic” policymaking, because he believed it relied
upon unrealistic assumptions about our cognitive and analytical abili-
ties in the face of very complex problems.15  Although perhaps a logi-
cal approach in theory, policymakers would never actually be able to
apply the classic model when faced with such problems in the real
world.16  An innumerable array of objectives and values are at stake in
any complex social issue.17  Even if decisionmakers could identify all
of them, they would likely disagree about their relative importance
and find conflicts and contradictions among them.18  Moreover,
policymakers inevitably have limited resources, and gathering and
processing information about the likely effects of all possible policy
alternatives would be an enormous and often impossible undertak-
ing.19  The classic model thus “assumes intellectual capacities and
sources of information” that people simply do not possess.20  Lind-
blom recognized that the comprehensive or synoptic style is therefore
impossible in practice and argued that “every administrator faced with
a sufficiently complex problem must find ways drastically to
simplify.”21
Under Lindblom’s approach, policymakers simplify by “muddling
through” as best they can, making policy in an incremental fashion.22
They focus on one relatively simple goal at a time, and they consider
14. See Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 13, at 79 (describing the R
methodology an administrator might use to formulate a policy regarding inflation under
the comprehensive model of policymaking).
15. See id. at 80.
16. Id.; see Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, supra note 13, at 519 (arguing that R
complete, synoptic analysis is impossible, and thus our real choice is “between [the] ill-
considered, often accidental incompleteness” of pseudo-comprehensive analysis and the
“deliberate, designed incompleteness” of incrementalism).
17. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, supra note 13, at 518. R
18. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 13, at 81–82. R
19. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, supra note 13, at 518. R
20. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 13, at 80. R
21. Id. at 84.
22. See id. at 80–83; Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, supra note 13, at 517. R
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just a few policy alternatives, all of which are only marginally different
from the status quo and from each other.23  They choose one, imple-
ment it, wait to see the consequences, and then consider whether to
try making another small adjustment.24  Policy, therefore, “does not
move in leaps and bounds,” “is not made once and for all,” and, in-
stead changes “almost entirely through incremental adjustments,” be-
ing “made and re-made endlessly.”25
Lindblom discussed incremental policymaking both descriptively
and normatively.  He asserted that incrementalism is how policymak-
ing actually occurs, and that it is generally the optimal approach.26
Incrementalism has the virtue of breaking down an enormous prob-
lem into manageable parts.  It allows for gradual change with less risk
because policymakers can correct any missteps through the continual
cycle of experimentation, feedback, and adjustment.  By virtue of its
decentralized structure, incremental change also makes it possible to
have more local, popular control over formulation of policy.27  Incre-
mentalism “will be superior to any other decision-making method
available for complex problems in many circumstances,” Lindblom ar-
gued, “certainly superior to a futile attempt at superhuman
comprehensiveness.”28
Lindblom’s dichotomy29 between comprehensive and incremen-
tal approaches to policymaking has been enormously influential in
political and other social science fields.30  Most observers shared Lind-
blom’s enthusiasm for incremental policymaking, describing how it
achieved or could achieve positive results on issues ranging from
23. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” supra note 13, at 84. R
24. Id. at 86.
25. Id. at 84, 86.
26. Id. at 88.
27. Id. at 85–86.
28. Id. at 85.
29. While drawing a sharp contrast between purely incremental and completely com-
prehensive approaches is often useful in theoretical discussion, the truth is that policymak-
ing could be done in a manner found anywhere along a spectrum or continuum between
the two.  Ian Lustick, Explaining the Variable Utility of Disjointed Incrementalism: Four Proposi-
tions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 342, 344 (1980).
30. See Edward J. Woodhouse & David Collingridge, Incrementalism, Intelligent Trial-and-
Error, and the Future of Political Decision Theory, in AN HERETICAL HEIR OF THE ENLIGHTEN-
MENT: POLITICS, POLICY, AND SCIENCE IN THE WORK OF CHARLES E. LINDBLOM 131, 133–34
(Harry Redner ed., 1993) (describing how Lindblom’s work has been reprinted in dozens
of anthologies, there have been “several thousand citations to the seminal works,” and
“[t]he insights would seem to have been about as well incorporated into the discipline as
could be hoped for any set of ideas”).
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health care to television violence.31  In harmony with “public choice”
or economic market oriented schools of policy analysis, the incremen-
tal model aims to achieve optimal policy through a galaxy of scattered
decisions, rather than a larger, centralized planning mechanism.32
Reflecting America’s political character as well its market orientation,
incremental change is a natural product of pluralistic democracy in
which diverse interests compete and bargain.33  Accordingly, scholars
regard incrementalism “as the standard—indeed almost ubiquitous—
mode of policy enactment in the United States.”34
A few political scientists have challenged the incrementalist or-
thodoxy, however, by describing a small but significant set of policy
matters that have been or should be pursued in a nonincremental
manner.  For instance, Paul Schulman found a quintessential example
in our nation’s efforts to achieve President John Kennedy’s goal of
sending astronauts to the moon within a decade.35  Schulman charac-
terized that initiative as fundamentally indivisible because it de-
manded a massive commitment of resources, centralized
organization, and comprehensive planning, coordination, and consol-
idation.36  In other words, thousands of individuals tinkering alone in
their garages might produce some impressive technological break-
throughs, such as development of better personal computers,37 but
individual efforts could not put a person on the moon.  Moreover, the
31. See, e.g., Samuel Levey & James Hill, Universal Health Insurance: Incrementalism or
Comprehensive Reform?, 3 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 189, 191–93 (1991) (arguing that health
care reform in this country will inevitably come about slowly and incrementally); Joel Tim-
mer, Incrementalism and Policymaking on Television Violence, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 351, 382–83
(2004) (explaining that incremental policymaking can result in good policy); see also gener-
ally Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393
(1981) (explaining in detail the “incrementalism” and “comprehensive rationality” models
and applying them to administrative law).
32. See Amitai Etzioni, Mixed-Scanning: A “Third” Approach to Decision-Making, 27 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 385, 387 (1967) (describing incrementalism as “the typical decision-making
process of pluralistic societies, as contrasted with the master planning of totalitarian socie-
ties”); Paul R. Schulman, Nonincremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternative Paradigm,
69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1354, 1354 (1975) (discussing the relation between an incremental
model of policymaking and public choice or economic market models of the policy
process).
33. Levey & Hill, supra note 31, at 192. R
34. JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 9 (1984); see also Lustick, supra note 29, at 343 (arguing that incre- R
mentalism is becoming “a new conventional wisdom”).
35. Schulman, supra note 32, at 1355. R
36. Id. at 1355–62.
37. Darren Vader, Biography: Steve Jobs, The Apple Museum, http://www.theapple
museum.com/index.php?id=49 (last visited Mar. 28, 2008) (describing how Steve Jobs cre-
ated the Apple, the first personal computer, in his garage).
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moon project was an all-or-nothing enterprise.  As NASA chief James
Webb put it, “[w]e could not stop with doing 80 or 90 or 99 per cent
of what we needed to do and come out reasonably well,” because “for
a lunar landing a partial success is likely to be a complete failure.”38
Jennifer Hochschild presented another example that closely mir-
rors the gun control issue in some ways.39  She concluded that incre-
mentalism was an ineffective and counterproductive approach to
desegregating public schools in the three decades following Brown v.
Board of Education.40  Integrating schools through a series of small,
gradual steps was an appealing idea because it seemed like a way to
minimize disruptions, maintain flexibility, increase local control over
the process, build popular support, and learn from experimentation
and experience.41  In reality, however, Hochschild found that incre-
mentalism did more harm than good because it fostered opposition
and resistance to integration.42  Temporal incrementalism, or gradu-
ally and sporadically phasing in changes, created instability and uncer-
tainty, failed to demonstrate a decisive commitment to integration,
and thereby invited resistance.43  Likewise, Hochschild found that lo-
cal forces could undercut desegregation too easily if it was not imple-
mented on the largest possible geographic or spatial scale.44  For
example, if one school district moved forward with integration efforts,
such as busing, while surrounding districts did not, “white flight” from
the integrating district would sabotage the effort.45
Hochschild concluded that a more comprehensive approach
would have achieved much better results.  A comprehensive desegre-
gation effort covering an entire metropolitan area would have made
white flight more difficult and “is such a massive undertaking that it is
bound to seem permanent and may induce parents to dig in and try
to make it work for their children.”46  While a “full-scale, rapid, exten-
38. Schulman, supra note 32, at 1362 (quoting JAMES E. WEBB, SPACE-AGE MANAGEMENT: R
THE LARGE-SCALE APPROACH 149 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
39. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 34, at 10–11. R
40. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); HOCHSCHILD, supra note 34, at 47. R
41. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 34, at 46–47. R
42. Id. at 48.
43. See id. at 46–54 (finding that school districts that initiated rapid change had more
success than those that took small steps over a long period of time).
44. See id. at 54–70 (arguing that desegregation involving large geographical areas al-
lows for beneficial mixing of students with different academic achievement and socioeco-
nomic class, while desegregation of only a few contiguous schools forces children together
who are economic and social rivals, causing more racial hostility, instability, and white
flight, without the beneficial redistribution of educational resources).
45. Id. at 64.
46. Id. at 65.
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sive” overhaul of schools initially would have been very unpopular
with the public, Hochschild argued that it ultimately would have mini-
mized resistance and circumvention, achieved more integration, and
improved race relations and student achievement.47
Hochschild further argued that incremental efforts to desegre-
gate actually produced worse results than doing nothing at all.48  In-
cremental changes—“halfhearted, restricted, timid” in nature—did
little to help either minority or majority race students and instead
caused substantial harm in the form of racial resentment, increased
residential segregation, and decreased minority self-esteem and
achievement.49  While the conventional wisdom says that “[h]alf a loaf
is better than none,” Hochschild concluded that this principle did not
hold true for desegregation,50 and that “[h]alf a loaf, in this case, may
be worse than none at all.”51
As these examples suggest, some social problems are less suited to
incremental solutions.  Theorists have therefore begun to identify
general principles for determining whether a particular issue should
be handled through a more incremental or comprehensive poli-
cymaking strategy.52  Ian Lustick observed that incrementalism is less
useful when a problem is “non-decomposable,” meaning it cannot eas-
ily be broken up into parts to be handled separately.53  Lustick offered
the example of two societies seeking to protect their water resources,
with one having its water dispersed into many separate watersheds and
the other having virtually all of its water concentrated in one body of
water such as a large river.54  Environmental policymakers in the first
society might prefer incrementalism because they can encourage each
watershed to experiment with different methods of water regulation.55
Successful methods can be repeated elsewhere, and failures will have
limited effects rather than causing adverse consequences throughout
the society’s entire water system.56
The second society’s authorities, however, face a problem of “rel-
atively non-decomposable complexity,” because the water resources
47. Id. at 91.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at xi.
51. Id. at 91.
52. See, e.g., Lustick, supra note 29, at 342 (presenting an analysis designed to help R
organizational theorists match policymaking strategies to different situations).
53. Id. at 346.
54. Id. at 347.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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are interconnected.57  This society needs a comprehensive, central-
ized regulatory regime, because “local errors in pollution abatement,
for example, could lead to contamination of the vast majority of the
society’s water resources.”58  In Lustick’s terms, the water issue in the
second society is characterized by “causal chains elongated in space,”
so that the policies instituted in any one area will have ramifications
elsewhere.59
In those exceptional circumstances, incrementalism stumbles
over what generally would be one of its major virtues.  As Justice Bran-
deis famously put it, “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments with-
out risk to the rest of the country.”60  Generally, local experimentation
is useful and poses less risk than national policy change because the
local policy affects a limited area, and because the institutions and
resources associated with the old policy approach remain in place in
other jurisdictions, providing a form of “institutional insurance” avail-
able to some extent if things go wrong in the experimenting jurisdic-
tion.61  However, in the special circumstances described by
Hochschild and Lustick, policymakers cannot conduct such geograph-
ically limited policy experiments because the policy’s subject matter—
whether people or water—flows across jurisdictional borders.
Incrementalism, thus, may be superior to more comprehensive or
synoptic policymaking efforts in many situations, but not in all.  As
Lindblom recognized, a generalized, abstract debate over which poli-
cymaking method is superior or inferior is “a spurious one, for ques-
tions about the merits of alternative methods arise in various specific
contexts; hence it is in these contexts that one needs finally to evalu-
ate them.”62  This Article now considers these policymaking ap-




60. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
61. See David Braybrooke, Scale, Combination, Opposition—A Rethinking of Incrementalism,
95 ETHICS 920, 926 (1985) (reviewing HOCHSCHILD, supra note 34) (arguing that an experi- R
menting jurisdiction can obtain outside resources if its experiment goes wrong).
62. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 13, at 293; see also R
Jonathan Bendor, A Model of Muddling Through, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819, 819 (1995)
(citing Lustick, supra note 29, at 342) (contending that debate over incremental versus R
comprehensive policymaking strategies “should be couched in terms of their relative effec-
tiveness in different decisional contexts, for it is unlikely that one is better than the other
in all circumstances”).
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III. INCREMENTAL POLICYMAKING ON GUNS
Guns remain one of America’s most stubbornly contentious is-
sues.  Three major, recent controversies—law enforcement confisca-
tion of guns after Hurricane Katrina, the strict gun laws of the District
of Columbia, and a mass shooting by a student at Virginia Tech—
illustrate well both this country’s propensity to take an incrementalist
approach to gun control, and the resultant problems stemming from
this piecemeal approach.
A. Hurricane Katrina
In late August of 2005, as Hurricane Katrina intensified over the
warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico, Mayor Ray Nagin ordered re-
sidents of New Orleans to evacuate.63  Thousands of people without
means to flee the storm headed to the city’s “shelter of last resort,” the
enormous Superdome stadium.64  A long line of people snaked
around the Superdome, waiting to enter, as police and National
Guard troops searched people and their belongings and confiscated
guns, knives, drugs, alcohol, cigarettes, and other items prohibited in-
side emergency shelters.65
Everyone is familiar with the disaster that followed.  The storm
devastated the Gulf Coast, claiming more than a thousand lives and
inflicting billions of dollars in property damage.66  The flood protec-
tion system in New Orleans failed catastrophically; the storm breached
the city’s 350-mile levee, flooding the majority of the city.67  Chaos
ensued after the hurricane, with looters raiding stores and snipers fir-
ing on police and other emergency personnel.68  On August 31, sev-
eral days after the hurricane’s peak, Mayor Nagin ordered most of the
city’s police officers to concentrate on cracking down on looting and
63. Christopher Lee & Peter Whoriskey, Hurricane Bears Down on Gulf Coast; Thousands
Flee Area as Vulnerable New Orleans Braces for Direct Hit, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2005, at A1.
64. Mike Hasten, Millions Flee Hurricane Katrina, TIMES (Shreveport, La.), Aug. 29, 2005,
at 1A.
65. Id.; Aaron Sharockman, Eyes on New Orleans: Refugees Line up for Superdome Lock-in,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at 1A.
66. See THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 7–8 (2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf (stating that
Hurricane Katrina caused approximately $96 billion in property damages and claimed an
estimated 1,330 lives).
67. See id. at 1–2.
68. Felicity Barringer & Jere Longman, Owners Take up Arms as Looters Press Their Advan-
tage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A16. See generally Robert D. McFadden & Ralph Blumen-
thal, Bush Sees Long Recovery for New Orleans; 30,000 Troops in Largest U.S. Relief Effort, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2005, at A1 (describing the chaos and the government’s response in New
Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina).
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other crimes rather than undertaking search and rescue efforts.69  At
the New Orleans convention center, where there had not been time
to search entrants for weapons as was done at the Superdome,
“[g]unfire became so routine that large SWAT teams had to storm the
place nearly every night.”70  The news media spread rumors that par-
ticularly vicious crimes occurred, such as child rape and murder.71
Most of these horror stories turned out to be false, but they height-
ened fears in the midst of an already chaotic and treacherous
situation.72
While many people used guns for nefarious purposes, others
used them for security at a time when law enforcement seemed inca-
pable of providing it.73  Citizens stood guard at their homes and busi-
nesses, using highly visible guns to deter trespassers.74  People wrote
hand-painted messages outside buildings, warning that occupants
69. McFadden & Blumenthal, supra note 68.  Newspapers reported: R
Across New Orleans, the rule of law, like the city’s levees, could not hold out after
Hurricane Katrina.  The desperate and the opportunistic took advantage of an
overwhelmed police force and helped themselves to anything that could be car-
ried, wheeled or floated away, including food, water, shoes, television sets, sport-
ing goods and firearms.
Barringer & Longman, supra, note 68; see also Al Baker, Duty Binds Officers Who Have Gone to R
Help After Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, § 1, at 30 (reporting thefts of “entire inventories
from gun and ammunition shops”).
70. Eric Lipton et al., Breakdowns Marked Path from Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2005, § 1, at 1.
71. See Gary Younge, Aftermath of Katrina: Murder and Rape—Fact or Fiction?, GUARDIAN
(London), Sept. 6, 2005, at 5 (describing the unsubstantiated reports of rape, murdered
children, and erupting riots).
72. See Jim Dwyer & Christopher Drew, Fear Exceeded Crime’s Reality in New Orleans, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at A1 (reporting that many of the most alarming and false stories
created such fear that troop deployments changed, medical evacuations were delayed, and
police officers quit); see also Peter Applebome, Amid One City’s Welcome, a Tinge of Backlash,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at A17 (noting that Baton Rouge residents feared that refugees
would commit crimes); David Carr, More Horrible than Truth: News Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 2005, at C1 (stating that the media did not substantiate or prove many of the news
stories in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina); Howard Witt, Spreading the Poison of Big-
otry, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2005, at C5 (contending that the rumors “played directly into the
darkest prejudices long held against the hundreds of thousands of impoverished blacks
who live . . . in New Orleans”); Younge, supra note 71 (explaining that the rumors hastened R
the relief effort but demonized the victims).
73. See Baker, supra note 69 (reporting that a number of police officers in New Orleans R
simply resigned, abandoned their posts, or committed suicide after Hurricane Katrina).
Additionally, law enforcement efforts were troubled by communications equipment break-
downs and difficulty coordinating separate police agencies. Id.
74. See Barringer & Longman, supra note 68 (“Some frightened homeowners took se- R
curity into their own hands.”); Erich Pratt, Katrina Educates World on Need for Owning Guns,
Sept. 2005, http://www.gunowners.org/no02.htm (reporting stories of armed homeown-
ers standing guard).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 13 28-APR-08 7:13
2008] THE FUTURE OF GUN CONTROL 523
were armed and prepared to shoot looters.75  Some neighbors formed
makeshift militias, sharing firearms and taking turns standing guard.76
Although Wal-Mart suspended sales of guns at forty of its stores in the
Gulf Coast region,77 sales surged at other gun stores in New Orleans
and in nearby cities, like Baton Rouge, nervously facing an influx of
refugees.78  Two weeks after the flooding began, the city was still strug-
gling to recover, but the streets were calm and looting had largely
ceased.79  The press reported that New Orleans police officers had
begun “confiscating weapons, including legally registered firearms,
from civilians in preparation for a mass forced evacuation of the re-
sidents still living [t]here.”80  New Orleans police superintendent Ed-
win P. Compass III declared that, “after a week of near anarchy in the
city,” civilians in New Orleans would no longer be allowed to carry
firearms, and instead “[o]nly law enforcement [will be] allowed to
have weapons.”81
75. John R. Lott, Jr., Defenseless Decision: Why Were Guns Taken from Law-abiding Citizens in
New Orleans?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Mar. 21, 2006, http://www.nationalreview.com/
comment/lott200603210744.asp.
76. David B. Kopel, Defenseless on the Bayou: New Orleans Gun Confiscation Is Foolish and
Illegal, REASON, Sept. 2005, available at http://www.reason.com/news/printer/36334.html;
Susan Langenhennig, Makeshift Militia Guards Algiers Point: They’re Armed to the Teeth, but
Haven’t Fired a Shot, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 9, 2005, at A1.
77. Sasha Talcott, Halted Gun Sales Infuriate Customers, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 2005, at
A19.
78. See Applebome, supra note 72 (reporting that fearful Baton Rouge residents waited R
in line for hours to stock up on handguns); Timothy Appleby, Baton Rouge Welcomes Refugees
with Open Arms—and Firearms, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 5, 2005, at A8 (reporting “a
rush of gun-buying” in Baton Rouge spurred by the influx of displaced New Orleans re-
sidents); Lorraine Woellert, Guns and Water: The Rage of the NRA, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 26,
2005, at 53 (reporting that “gun sales are soaring”).
79. Alex Berenson & Timothy Williams, New Orleans Begins Confiscating Firearms as Water
Recedes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/08/
national/nationalspecial/08cnd-storm.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
80. Id.; Alex Berenson & John M. Broder, Police Begin Seizing Guns of Civilians, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A17.
81. Berenson & Broder, supra note 80.  W.J. Riley, who was then the second highest R
ranking officer on the New Orleans police force and later succeeded Compass as superin-
tendent, was also quoted as saying, “No one will be able to be armed.  We are going to take
all the weapons.”  Robert Raffaele, New Orleans Authorities Search for Residents One House at a
Time, VOICE AM. NEWS, Sept. 9, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 19184402.  The New York
Times went on to note:
But that order apparently does not apply to hundreds of security guards hired by
businesses and some wealthy individuals to protect property.  The guards, employ-
ees of private security companies like Blackwater, openly carry M-16’s and other
assault rifles.  Mr. Compass said that he was aware of the private guards, but that
the police had no plans to make them give up their weapons.
Berenson & Williams, supra note 79. R
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Compass explained that although neither the mayor nor the gov-
ernor had specifically directed him to ban or to confiscate guns, he
interpreted a gubernatorial order declaring a state of emergency as
authorizing the police to do so.82  In fact, a Louisiana statute did au-
thorize Compass, as the chief law enforcement officer of the city, dur-
ing a state of emergency proclaimed by the governor, to promulgate
orders “[r]egulating and controlling the possession, storage, display,
sale, transport and use of firearms, other dangerous weapons and am-
munition.”83  Other provisions of the same statute authorized law en-
forcement chiefs to issue orders “[p]rohibiting the sale and
distribution of alcoholic beverages,” “[p]rohibiting and controlling
the presence of persons on public streets and places,” and prohibiting
price gouging,84 a difference in wording that suggested the section
authorizing Compass to “regulate” and “control” guns might not em-
power him to “prohibit” them.
It is unclear to what extent police officers knew about and acted
on Compass’s pronouncements, and it is difficult to reconstruct given
the chaos unfolding in New Orleans at that time.  Several officers later
reportedly said that they were ordered at a roll call to seize any guns
possessed by any person who could not prove lawful ownership of
them.85
In any event, news reports of Compass’s statements sparked an
intense outcry from the National Rifle Association (NRA) and other
gun rights organizations,86 and the issue soon became fodder for out-
raged talk show hosts87 and a flurry of newspaper editorials and opin-
ion columns.88  Electronic media gave life to the story as television
82. Scott Gold et al., Katrina’s Aftermath; Crews Roust Holdouts, Brace for the Body Count,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A1.
83. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:329.6(A)(6) (Supp. 2007).  Louisiana’s governor had de-
clared a state of emergency on August 26, 2005. See Press Release, Office of the Governor,
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, State of Louisiana, Governor Blanco Declares State of Emer-
gency (Aug. 26, 2005), http://www.gov.state.la.us/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&
catID=1&articleID=776&navID=3.
84. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:329.6(A)(4), (5), (9).
85. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Hold Defendants C. Ray Nagin & Warren
Riley in Contempt for Violation of the Consent Order at 7, NRA v. Nagin, Civil No. 05-
4234, 2005 WL 2428840 (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 2005).
86. Melanie Hunter, Gun Rights Group Outraged That New Orleans Officials Confiscated
Guns, CYBERCAST NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 9, 2005, http://www.cnsnews.com/Culture/Archive/
200509/CUL20050909b.html; Rowland Nethaway, Editorial, Confiscating Guns in the Bayou
City, COX NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 16, 2005.
87. See, e.g., Nancy Grace: FEMA Director Recalled (CNN television broadcast Sept. 9,
2005), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0509/09/ng.01.html).
88. See, e.g., Bob Barr, Op-Ed., Governments Ready, Willing to Go Too Far, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Sept. 28, 2005, at 15A; Editorial, Goon Control, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Sept. 15,
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news cameras recorded several seizures of guns, and the NRA quickly
produced a short video documentary on the issue that was widely
viewed through “YouTube” and other websites.89  In one clip, filmed
by a San Francisco news crew, visiting California Highway Patrol of-
ficers wrestled an elderly woman to the floor of her kitchen after she
showed them a small revolver.90
On September 22, the issue landed in court.  The NRA, the Sec-
ond Amendment Foundation (a smaller and more militant gun rights
organization), and an individual gun owner filed suit in federal court
in Louisiana seeking “to vindicate the constitutional rights of the law-
abiding citizens of Louisiana to keep and bear arms to protect them-
selves from criminal violence, and to enjoin confiscation of lawful fire-
arms.”91  The individual plaintiff, NRA member Buell Teel, alleged
that St. Tammany Parish sheriff’s officers confiscated two of his
rifles.92  The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the
seizures of guns violated the Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the United States Constitution, and an injunction compel-
ling police to return all unlawfully seized firearms.93
The next day, Mayor Nagin responded to the lawsuit by declaring
that he had never authorized the taking of firearms from citizens and
that he did not approve any statements the police superintendent had
made about taking weapons.94  Meanwhile, Superintendent Compass
denied that weapons had been seized from any law-abiding citizens.95
Because all defendants in the suit denied that the city had any policy
of seizing guns from law-abiding citizens or that it had in fact seized
any guns,96 a federal judge issued a consent decree enjoining confisca-
2005, at A13; Paul Gallant, Op-Ed., The Second Battle of New Orleans, J. NEWS (Westchester
County, N.Y.), Oct. 28, 2005, at 4B; Nethaway, supra note 86; Dimitri Vassilaros, Editorial, R
Big Easy Hard on Gun Rights, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Sept. 18, 2005, available at http://
www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_374924.html.
89. See Press Release, Second Amendment Found., SAF, NRA Ask Federal Court to Halt
New Orleans Gun Seizures (Sept. 22, 2005), http://www.saf.org/viewpr-new.asp?id=161.
The NRA’s video, “The Untold Story of Gun Confiscation After Katrina,” can be viewed at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-taU9d26wT4&mode=related&search=.
90. See Press Release, Second Amendment Found., supra note 89. R
91. Complaint ¶ 1, NRA v. Nagin, Civil No. 05-4234, 2005 WL 3546132 (E.D. La. Sept.
23, 2005).
92. Id. ¶¶ 4, 18.
93. Id. ¶ 1.
94. Nagin Responds to NRA Suit, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 23, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR
19477273.
95. Id.
96. NRA v. Nagin, Civil No. 05-02,000, 2005 WL 2428840, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 23,
2005).  The third defendant in the case, the Sheriff of St. Tammany Parish, denied that his
office had “illegally” confiscated any firearms.  Id.  It was unclear whether the sheriff was
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tion of any lawfully possessed firearms and ordering the return of any
that had been seized.97
That was hardly the end of the matter.  The litigation dragged on
throughout 2006 and into 2007, as the NRA and the Second Amend-
ment Foundation complained that New Orleans officials were too slow
to ensure that seized guns still in police custody were returned to their
owners.98
Meanwhile, with “Remember New Orleans” as its rallying cry, the
NRA seized on the events to whip up a frenzy of outrage and fear
among its supporters.99  Boasting to the press about how the issue
would be used to recruit new members, NRA Chief Executive Wayne
LaPierre bragged that “[t]his will probably mint money for us.”100  He
vowed, “[w]e’re gonna make New Orleans the worst nightmare the
gun ban crowd has ever seen.”101  To garner publicity on the eve of its
next annual convention after the hurricane, the NRA took out a full-
page ad in the USA Today newspaper, calling on every police chief and
mayor in the country to sign a pledge promising they would “never
forcibly disarm . . . law-abiding citizens.”102
The NRA also took the issue to legislators, pushing for passage of
federal and state legislation to prohibit seizure of guns in emergencies
in the future.  The federal enactment, signed into law by President
Bush in October 2006 as part of a Department of Homeland Security
appropriations measure, barred seizing, banning, or requiring regis-
tration of guns during provision of relief from a “major disaster or
denying that any confiscations occurred or merely asserting that whatever confiscations
occurred were lawful. Id.
97. Id. at *2.
98. See Press Release, Second Amendment Found., New Orleans Admits to SAF Attor-
neys They Have Seized Guns (Mar. 15, 2006), http://www.saf.org/viewpr-new.asp?id=177
(explaining that city officials denied they possessed firearms seized from citizens for five
months before admitting otherwise); Press Release, Second Amendment Found., New Or-
leans Will Begin Returning Seized Firearms Monday, Says SAF (Apr. 14, 2006), http://
www.saf.org/viewpr-new.asp?id=178 (same); Press Release, Second Amendment Found.,
SAF Victory in New Orleans, Judge Grants Contempt Motion (Feb. 13, 2007), http://
www.saf.org/viewpr-new.asp?id=211 (noting that a judge held Mayor Nagin and Police Su-
perintendent Warren Riley “in contempt for failure to provide initial disclosures and an-
swers to discovery”).
99. Brian Friel, NRA’s Cry: ‘Remember New Orleans,’ NAT’L J., Nov. 19, 2005.
100. Id.
101. Jeff Johnson, NRA Tells Conservatives to ‘Remember New Orleans,’ CYBERCAST NEWS SER-
VICE, Feb. 13, 2006, http://www.cnsnews.com/Nation/Archive/200602/NAT20060213c.
html.
102. See Greg J. Borowski & Darryl Enriquez, NRA Packs the Heat of 4 Million Members; Gun
Rights Group Launches Initiative as National Convention Opens in Milwaukee, MILWAUKEE J. SEN-
TINEL, May 19, 2006, at A1.
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emergency.”103  The federal law applies not only to officers and em-
ployees of the United States government, but also to others operating
pursuant to federal law, receiving federal funds, or acting under the
control of federal officials.104  It passed by wide margins of 84 to 16 in
the U.S. Senate,105 and 322 to 99 in the House.106
Although each chamber of Congress engaged in some debate
over the proposal, no one disagreed about a core proposition: police
should not make blanket sweeps during disasters to take guns away
from law-abiding homeowners.  Even the most ardent supporters of
gun control who spoke against the bill, such as Senator Dick Durbin
and Representative Carolyn McCarthy, emphasized that they would
have no objection to a more limited bill that would merely “allow peo-
ple to protect their own homes with their own legally owned fire-
arms.”107  Along with other opponents of the bill, they readily
recognized “the need for law-abiding citizens to be able to protect
themselves against criminals breaking into their homes, particularly
when law enforcement is unable to protect its citizens after a cata-
strophic disaster.”108
Instead, debate focused on whether the legislation had been
drafted with sufficient precision to ban overzealous confiscation of
guns without interfering with law enforcement agencies’ efforts to
deal sensibly with risks posed by guns in emergency situations.  For
example, Senator Ted Kennedy suggested that if police found a Wal-
103. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 557,
120 Stat. 1355, 1391–92 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5207 (Supp. 2007)).
104. Id.
105. 152 CONG. REC. S7497 (daily ed. July 13, 2006).  The Senate vote was actually on a
brief provision that merely would have prohibited the Department of Homeland Security
from using any of its 2007 funding appropriation to confiscate firearms during an emer-
gency. Id. at S7458 (introducing Amendment No. 4615 to H.R. 5441, 109th Cong. (2006)).
The House of Representatives soon passed a more detailed provision that would perma-
nently prohibit such confiscations, and it was that broader provision that wound up being
enacted, see supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. R
106. 152 CONG. REC. H5814 (daily ed. July 25, 2006).
107. Id. at S7493 (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (statement of Sen. Durbin); see also id. at
H5758 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. McCarthy) (“We do not believe in going
into someone’s home without due cause [for purposes of] getting someone’s gun.”).  Like-
wise, Representative Jim Oberstar related a story about a close friend who could not reach
his gun when looters broke into his home during Hurricane Katrina. Id. at H5760 (state-
ment of Rep. Oberstar).  While “[t]here are many circumstances of this kind, where the
person . . . should be able to protect him or herself in their own home,” he opposed the
bill because it would allow guns to be brought into shelters like the Superdome or conven-
tion center. Id.
108. H.R. REP. NO. 109-596, at 7 (2006) (additional views).  Representatives in the mi-
nority expressed concerns in the additional views section of the report that the language of
the bill was broader than its stated intent. Id.
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Mart store or pawn shop that had been shut down during “a 9/11-type
situation,” with its windows broken and a large stock of guns still sit-
ting on its shelves, the new federal law would prohibit police from
taking the guns for safekeeping and thereby depriving looters of the
opportunity to steal them.109  Likewise, Senator Frank Lautenberg ex-
pressed concern that the law would prevent police from taking guns
and ammunition found in an abandoned home in a neighborhood in
which looters were known to be prowling.110  Members of the House
of Representatives also questioned why police or military officers in a
moment of crisis, such as a terrorist attack, should not be able to or-
der everyone in the area to surrender their firearms if there is not
sufficient time to determine who is a terrorist and who is a law-abiding
citizen.111
Supporters of the proposed measure agreed that there could be
circumstances in which guns should be confiscated.  For example,
Senator Larry Craig, an NRA board member,112 acknowledged that it
was sensible for police to prohibit possession of guns by those seeking
shelter in the Superdome during Hurricane Katrina and, in his view,
nothing in the new law would prohibit police from turning away any-
one who refused to surrender a gun before entering an emergency
relief site during a future disaster.113  Other boosters of the measure
pointed out that an exception had been inserted into the law to allow
authorities to require evacuees to surrender firearms temporarily
while being transported on airplanes or buses.114
Many states passed similar statutes prohibiting gun confiscations
by state or local officers during emergencies.115  These measures en-
109. 152 CONG. REC. S7491 (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
110. Id. at S7492 (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
111. H.R. REP. NO. 109-596, at 8 (2006).
112. NRA Leaders, http://www.nraleaders.com/senator-larry-craig.html (last visited
Mar. 31, 2008).
113. 152 CONG. REC. S7490 (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (statement of Sen. Craig). But see
H.R. REP. NO. 109-596, at 8 (2006) (explaining that the bill would prevent authorities from
banning weapons from shelters like the Superdome); 152 CONG. REC. H5758 (daily ed. July
25, 2006) (statement of bill sponsor Rep. Jindal) (explaining that the bill prevents authori-
ties from banning weapons in a shelter during emergencies unless a preexisting law already
prohibited guns in the type of building, such as a school or sports arena, being used as a
shelter).
114. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5207(b) (2007); see, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H5759 (daily ed. July 25,
2006) (statement of Rep. Jindal) (explaining that his bill grants discretion to officials to
temporarily seize firearms during evacuations if state law requires such seizures).
115. See, e.g., 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 32, § 2 (adding ALASKA STAT. § 26.23.205
(2006)); 2007 Ariz. Legis. Serv. ch. 101 (West) (amending ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-303(K)
(2007)); 2006 Fla. Laws ch. 2006-100 (amending FLA. STAT. ch. 252.36(5)(h) (2006)); 2006
Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 264, § 1 (amending IDAHO CODE § 46-1008(7) (2006)); 2006 Ky. Acts
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joyed wide support in state legislatures, with bills passing in Florida,
Louisiana, and Virginia without a single dissenting vote in either
house of the legislatures.116  In April 2007, the NRA took a victory lap
around Louisiana, holding rallies at gun stores across the state to cele-
brate enactment of the anti-confiscation legislation and to squeeze
further attention out of the issue.117
Gun control advocates largely remained quiet while the NRA beat
the New Orleans drum.  A spokesperson for the Brady Campaign to
Prevent Gun Violence called the issue “a non-problem in America.”118
The Coalition to Stop Gun Violence dubbed it “a lot of hyperbole,”
and suggested that gun control groups and the NRA alike should al-
low law enforcement agencies to handle such matters.119
While New Orleans police went too far with their impromptu and
ill-advised declarations about blanket confiscations, they could have
justified special restrictions and even firearm seizures if the restric-
tions were more carefully tailored to the emergency circumstances.
For example, police took possession of guns stashed in alleyways or
left behind in houses by residents who fled the hurricane.120  Even the
most ardent gun rights advocates could not fault the police for “gath-
ering firearms they found in abandoned New Orleans homes, to pre-
ch. 240, § 7 (adding KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 237.104 (2006)); 2006 La. Acts 275, § 2 (adding
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:738 (2006)); 2006 Mich. Pub. Acts 546 (amending MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 10.31 (2006)); 2006 Miss. Laws ch. 450, § 1 (amending MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-
53(1)(d) (2006)); 2007 Mo. Legis. Serv. S.B. 257 (West) (adding MO. REV. STAT. § 44.101
(2007)); 2007 Mont. Laws ch. 459; 2007 Nev. Stat. ch. 119 (amending NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 414, 414.030, 414.070 (2007)); 2006 N.H. Laws ch. 124 (amending N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-46(I-a) (2006)); 2006 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 70 (West) (amending OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 1321.4(a)(5) (2006)); 2006 S.C. Acts 347 (amending S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-31-520
(2006)); 2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 129 (adding TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-2-107(m) (2007));
2007 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 18 (West) (adding TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 433.0045
(2007)); 2006 Va. Acts ch. 458 (amending VA. CODE ANN. § 44-146.15(3) (2006)); 2007 W.
Va. Acts ch. 210 (adding W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-5-19a (2007)).
116. 152 CONG. REC. S7493-94 (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (statement of Sen. Vitter) (in-
serting into record a list of ten states that passed laws prohibiting gun seizures during
emergencies).
117. Bill Campbell, NRA Officials Praise Vitter, Jindal for Gun Stance, NEWS-STAR (Monroe,
La.), Apr. 5, 2007, at 1A; Alexandyr Kent, Jindal, Vitter Address Supporters at Gun Rights Rally,
TIMES (Shreveport, La.), Apr. 5, 2007, at 3A; Robert Morgan, Second Amendment Tour Visits
Cenla, DAILY TOWN TALK (Alexandria, La.), Apr. 5, 2007, at 6A.
118. John Hartzell, NRA Asks City Officials to Pledge They Will Never Seize Guns, HOUS.
CHRON., May 19, 2006, at A10 (quoting Peter Hamm, a spokesperson for the Brady Cam-
paign to Prevent Gun Violence).
119. Carrie Sheffield, Start of Hurricane Season Triggers Gun Debate, HILL, June 6, 2006, at
8 (quoting Joshua Horowitz, director of the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence).
120. Trymaine Lee, NOPD, NRA Call Truce over Gun Seizures, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 22,
2006, at 1.
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vent them from falling into the hands of criminals.”121  Likewise,
police and soldiers handling refugee evacuation sensibly conducted
searches of passengers being taken by bus and airplane to shelters in
other states.122
The NRA and its allies, however, challenged even limited gun re-
strictions.  For example, a month after the hurricane, the NRA and
the Second Amendment Foundation attacked local law enforcement
officials for persuading the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) to ban tenants of an evacuee trailer park near Baton Rouge
from possessing guns.123  A sheriff’s deputy who took responsibility for
initiating the gun ban explained that he was a devoted member of the
NRA, but in this instance he felt gun rights were outweighed by the
dangerous possibility that any bullet fired could penetrate through
several of the thin-walled trailers sitting just a few feet away from each
other in the crowded sites.124  Nevertheless, gun owner organizations
and their attorneys persuaded FEMA to reverse course and permit
guns in the trailer parks.125
The New Orleans gun confiscation episode turned out to be an
unmitigated fiasco for gun control efforts.  It not only gave the NRA
an issue with which to stir up fear among gun owners, but also over-
shadowed the negative role that guns played in the aftermath of the
storm.  Hurricane Katrina could have served as a powerful example of
the need for sensible restrictions on access to guns.  Indeed, to for-
eign observers, images of the chaos in New Orleans confirmed percep-
tions about America’s deadly fascination with guns and perverse
unwillingness to put reasonable controls on them.  As one BBC re-
porter said, drawing a contrast between Hurricane Katrina and the
121. Jeff Johnson, New Orleans Gun Seizures Allegedly ‘Creating More Victims,’ CYBERCAST
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 14, 2005,  http://www.cnsnews.com/Nation/Archive/200509/NAT
20050914a.html.
122. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 120 (describing how guns were seized from people trying R
to bring them onto evacuation buses); Bryon Okada, Screeners Kept Flights Moving, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 12, 2005, at B1 (describing searches of evacuees flown to
Dallas); Tony Perry, Katrina’s Aftermath: Astrodome Seen as a Comfort Zone, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2,
2005, at 17 (describing searches of evacuees bused to Houston); 57 Storm Evacuees at Lowry
Have Criminal Records, DENVER POST, Sept. 11, 2005, at C05 (describing searches of evacuees
flown to Denver).
123. Sheriff’s Office Got Trailer Site Gun Ban, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Oct. 14, 2005,
at 1B; Press Release, Second Amendment Found., SAF Demands Answers for Gun Ban at
FEMA Relief Center Outside Baton Rouge (Oct. 7, 2005), http://www.saf.org/viewpr-new.
asp?id=164.
124. Sheriff’s Office Got Trailer Site Gun Ban, supra note 123. R
125. Friel, supra note 99; Press Release, Second Amendment Found., FEMA Reverses No R
Guns Policy Following SAF Whistleblowing (Oct. 24, 2005), http://www.saf.org/viewpr-
new.asp?id=166.
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tsunami that devastated coastal areas surrounding the Indian Ocean
eight months earlier, “there were no scenes of armed gangs of looters
in gun battles with the police in Sri Lanka after the tsunami.”126
Indeed, perhaps the most appalling aspect of the New Orleans
gun seizure saga is that it managed to distract attention from the enor-
mously greater injustices and tragedies that occurred in the wake of
the hurricane.  Covering a national convention of conservative stu-
dents for Harper’s Magazine, Wells Towers perfectly captured how the
gun issue provided an easy distraction for those uninterested in seeing
far more important truths coming out of the Hurricane Katrina catas-
trophe.127  NRA head Wayne LaPierre was the surprise final speaker at
the conference and the crowd erupted into a frenzy of adoration as he
took the stage and introduced a video about the “poor souls” who
stayed in New Orleans during the hurricane.128  “It quickly becomes
apparent,” wrote Towers, “that by New Orleans’s ‘poor souls,’ La-
Pierre is not talking about the hundreds of thousands of people whose
homes were destroyed by Katrina, or the more than 40,000 who graph-
ically languished in the Superdome and the Morial Convention
Center while the levees failed.”129  As the audience of young conserva-
tive activists reacted with horror at the thought of police taking away a
relatively small number of guns, Towers realized:
LaPierre, in a single master stroke, ha[d] vanquished for the
students what is perhaps the darkest question to trouble the
national conscience of late; namely, how it happened that
this country required five days and hundreds of lives to pass
before deploying buses to an area in screaming range of a
navigable interstate.130
Thanks to LaPierre, the students left the convention reassured, believ-
ing that the great injustice of the Hurricane Katrina debacle had been
quickly and neatly cured by enactment of the legislation protecting
gun rights during emergencies.131
At the start of the next hurricane season after Katrina, the new
police superintendent of New Orleans, Warren Riley, caused a stir by
declaring in a radio interview that his officers would confiscate guns
126. Richard Bernstein, The Days After; The View from Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005,
§ 4, at 5.
127. Wells Tower, The Kids Are Far Right: Hippie Hunting, Bunny Bashing, and the New




131. Id. at 52–53.
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from people on the streets if another disastrous storm struck.132  A few
days later, after an outcry by gun rights organizations, Riley retracted
his statements.133
While Riley and gun advocates speculated and bickered about
what police would do in the event of another catastrophic hurricane,
a grim flood of weapons and violent crime was already overtaking New
Orleans.  In the years before Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans was the
nation’s murder capital.  Thanks in part to “shamefully easy access to
guns,” New Orleans’s homicide rate in 2004 was ten times the national
average and four and a half times the rate for similarly sized cities.134
With so many people displaced from the city, including violent
criminals, the murder rate plunged for a few months after the hurri-
cane.135  A wave of killings, however, soon restored New Orleans’s title
as America’s deadliest city.136
That epidemic of violent crime went hand in hand with soaring
levels of gun possession.  Even though the city’s population in 2006
was only half what it was before the hurricane, gun sales were up and
the number of permits issued to carry concealed firearms had
doubled.137  Everyone in New Orleans “from white society folk who
hire off-duty cops to patrol their streets to poor black kids who carry
guns while walking theirs—knows that the only real security in New
Orleans is private, not public.”138
While many citizens of New Orleans obtain guns simply to protect
themselves and others, widespread and easy access to guns also esca-
lates the frequency and lethality of crime in the city.  Civilians acting
in defense of themselves or others killed only two criminals in New
Orleans in 2006, a number overshadowed by the city’s 162 murders
132. Jonathan Betz, Riley Says He’ll Confiscate Weapons if Disaster Strikes, Gun Rights Activists
Outraged, WWL-TV NEWS, June 2, 2006, http://www.wwltv.com/local/stories/wwl060206jb
guns.4aac3cf1.htm.  Riley stated that “during a circumstance like that, we cannot allow
people to walk the street carrying guns,” and “as law enforcement officers we will confiscate
the weapon if a person is walking down the street and they may be arrested.” Id.
133. Press Release, Second Amendment Found., Riley Backs Down on New Orleans Gun
Grab After SAF Calls for Investigation (June 6, 2006), http://www.saf.org/viewpr-new
.asp?id=189.
134. Nicole Gelinas, Baghdad on the Bayou, CITY J., Spring 2007, at 42; Amanda Ripley,
What Happened to the Gangs of New Orleans?, TIME, May 22, 2006, at 54.
135. Ripley, supra note 134. R
136. Mary Foster, Fear Triggers Brisk Gun Sales in N.O., PRESS-REG. (Mobile, Ala.), Mar. 24,
2007, at A4.
137. Id. (“Just how many guns are out there is anybody’s guess” because “[g]un buyers in
Louisiana are not required to register their weapon or obtain a concealed-carry permit if
they keep the gun in their house or car.”).
138. Gelinas, supra note 134. R
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that year.139  In the first quarter of 2007, murders were up 182 percent
over the already high rate of the previous year, and armed robberies
had jumped 135 percent.140  Police attributed the dismal statistics to
proliferation of guns as well as the population flowing back into the
city.141
The stream of guns in New Orleans pours into criminal hands “at
an alarming rate.”142  The federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire-
arms and Explosives (ATF) tracks the average “time-to-crime,” or in-
terval between a firearm’s retail sale and its recovery by police in
connection with a crime, and considers short time-to-crime to be a
significant indicator of illegal firearm trafficking activity.143  The aver-
age time-to-crime is five years nationwide but six months in New
Orleans.144
New Orleans remains caught in a vicious cycle in which guns fuel
an escalation of violent crime that continually drives more people,
criminal-minded and law-abiding alike, to obtain and carry weapons.
“Guns are worse than ever” in New Orleans, reported a police ser-
geant.145  “It seems like every single person has a gun.”146  New Orle-
ans desperately needs a reasonable, comprehensive, long-term set of
measures to control access to guns and reduce gun violence.  Impro-
vised, overreaching, and largely ineffective fixes like the gun confisca-
tion efforts during Hurricane Katrina are not a sensible approach
from any perspective.
B. The District of Columbia
While New Orleans has recently held the dubious distinction of
being the nation’s “murder capital,” the District of Columbia held
that title for many years.147  The District has long been plagued by
high rates of gun violence, and it has the most restrictive gun laws in
139. Foster, supra note 136. R
140. Kevin Johnson, Easy Access to Guns Is Tough to Battle, USA TODAY, June 14, 2007, at
4A.
141. Id.
142. Foster, supra note 136. R
143. EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE, INSPECTION OF FIREARMS DEALERS BY THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TO-
BACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES 8 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/
ATF/e0405/final.pdf.
144. Foster, supra note 136 (citing ATF spokesperson Austin Banks). R
145. Johnson, supra note 140. R
146. Id.
147. See 151 CONG. REC. H5502 (daily ed. June 30, 2005) (statement of Rep. Souder)
(asserting that the District of Columbia was the “murder capital of the United States” for
fifteen of the last sixteen years).
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the country.148  How those laws affect levels of violent crime in the
District has been a prominent question in the gun control debate for
decades.149
The issue recently took center stage when a court decision invali-
dated several elements of the District’s gun laws and the case headed
to the U.S. Supreme Court for a historic showdown on the meaning of
the Second Amendment.  In Parker v. District of Columbia, a divided
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled
that four provisions of the District’s laws violate the Second Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.150  Although the judges’ task
was merely to assess the constitutionality of the laws and not their wis-
dom or value as a policy matter, the effectiveness of the District’s
tough restrictions on firearms was inevitably an underlying issue in the
case.  The Supreme Court agreed to review the case, redubbed District
of Columbia v. Heller, and heard oral argument on March 18, 2008,151
just as this Article went to press.  Observers predicted that it might
turn out to be “one of the most important cases in American history,
with profound political and policy implications.”152
The District’s gun laws are the product of several major pieces of
legislation.153  The United States Congress enacted the first one in
1932, adopting a set of measures that have been amended to some
extent over the years but remain part of D.C. law today.154  The 1932
legislation drew distinctions among several categories of guns.155
Only one significant element of the 1932 law applied across the board
148. Henri E. Cauvin, D.C. Asks Full Court to Study Gun Law; Appeals Panel Had Ruled
Against Ban, Angering Officials, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2007, at B1.
149. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Peril or Protection? The Risks and Benefits of Handgun Prohibi-
tion, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 285, 315–18 (1993) (discussing the effectiveness of D.C.’s
handgun ban on crime rates in the District).
150. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399–01 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub
nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007).
151. Warren Richey, Historic Case May Decide Gun Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar.
18, 2008, at 1.
152. Kenneth Blackwell & Sandra Froman, Op-Ed., The Roe v. Wade of Gun Rights, N.Y.
SUN, Mar. 14, 2008, at 11.
153. For a thorough history and description of the regulation of guns in the District of
Columbia, including measures enacted before the 1932 law, see Stephen P. Halbrook, Sec-
ond-Class Citizenship and the Second Amendment in the District of Columbia, 5 GEO. MASON U.
CIV. RTS. L.J. 105, 109–16 (1995).
154. Act of July 8, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-275, 47 Stat. 650 (codified as amended at D.C.
CODE §§ 22-4501 to -4516 (2001 & Supp. 2007)).
155. Id. § 1, 47 Stat. at 650 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 22-4501(a), (b), (c)
(Supp. 2007)) (defining “pistol,” “sawed-off shotgun,” and “machine gun”).
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to all types of firearms.  In that provision, Congress provided for en-
hanced prison sentences for violent crimes involving firearms.156
The legislation banned possession of “sawed-off shotgun[s]” and
“machine gun[s].”157  During the Prohibition Era, these were among
the weapons most closely associated with the gangster violence that
gripped the public’s attention.158  While the term “machine gun” ordi-
narily refers to a gun that fires automatically, meaning it fires more
than one round per trigger pull,159 the 1932 law rather bizarrely de-
fined a “machine gun” by ammunition capacity, deeming the term to
cover any firearm “which shoots automatically or semiautomatically
more than twelve shots without reloading.”160
A number of other measures in the 1932 law applied only to
handguns, and not to long guns such as rifles and shotguns.161  First,
Congress prohibited possession of a handgun in the District by any
person who had been convicted of a crime of violence.162  The 1932
law further prohibited the sale of a handgun to any person the seller
had reasonable cause to believe had been convicted of a violent crime
or was under eighteen years old, a drug addict, or “not of sound
mind.”163  Congress also imposed a forty-eight-hour waiting period on
handgun sales.164
For those not thereby disqualified from possessing handguns in
the District, the 1932 law imposed restrictions on carrying them con-
156. Id. § 2, 47 Stat. at 650–51 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 22-4502(a) (Supp.
2007)).
157. Id. § 14, 47 Stat. at 654 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 22-4514(a) (2001)).
Again, this provision contained exceptions such as for law enforcement and military per-
sonnel. Id.
158. See Allen Rostron, High-Powered Controversy: Gun Control, Terrorism, and the Fight over
.50 Caliber Rifles, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1415, 1428 (2005) (explaining how fears of organized
crime led to federal regulations of “gangster” weapons).
159. Id. at 1420.
160. Act of July 8, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-275, § 1, 47 Stat. 650, 650 (codified as amended
at D.C. CODE § 22-4501(c) (Supp. 2007)).  The 1932 law also contained several provisions
that applied to handguns, sawed-off shotguns, and machine guns, such as a requirement
that retail sellers of these weapons be licensed by the District’s government. Id. §§ 9-10, 47
Stat. at 652–53 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE §§ 22-4509 to -4510 (2001)).
161. The statute used the term “pistol” rather than handgun, but it defined “‘[p]istol’”
to include “any firearm with a barrel less than twelve inches in length” so that the term
encompassed revolvers as well as pistols. Id. § 1, 47 Stat. at 650 (codified as amended at
D.C. CODE § 22-4501(a) (Supp. 2007)).
162. Id. § 3, 47 Stat. at 651 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 22-4503 (Supp. 2007)).
163. Id. § 7, 47 Stat. at 652 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 22-4507 (2001)).
164. Id. § 8, 47 Stat. at 652 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 22-4508 (2001)).
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cealed.165  The law permitted carrying a concealed handgun in a per-
son’s “dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed
by him.”166  It banned carrying a concealed handgun outside those
locations unless the person obtained a license from the District’s su-
perintendent of police, which was to be issued “if it appears that the
applicant has good reason to fear injury to his person or property or
has any other proper reason for carrying a pistol and that he is a suita-
ble person to be so licensed.”167  While the 1932 law thus theoretically
left open the possibility of obtaining a license to carry a concealed
gun, such licenses were granted so rarely as to be “virtually
unobtainable.”168
Under the 1932 law, no license was needed to carry a handgun
openly, such as in a hip or side holster, rather than concealed.  Con-
gress changed this in 1943, amending the District’s gun law to pro-
hibit open carrying of handguns unless the person had a license or
stayed within the bounds of his own residential or business
property.169
Since then, every major round of legislation on firearms in the
District of Columbia has been the work of local government rather
than the United States Congress.  By the point when concern about
firearms reached a peak in 1968 after the assassinations of Reverend
Martin Luther King, Jr., and Senator Robert Kennedy,170 limited local
government authority in the District had been put into the hands of a
mayor-commissioner and city council appointed by the President of
165. Carrying concealed weapons generally had been prohibited in the District since
1892, and the 1932 law merely continued and revised that prohibition. See Halbrook, supra
note 153, at 109–12 (discussing the history of gun control legislation in the District). R
166. Act of July 8, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-275, § 4, 47 Stat. 650, 651 (codified as amended
at D.C. CODE § 22-4504 (2001)).
167. Id. § 6, 47 Stat. at 651 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 22-4506 (2001)).  The
law made exceptions for certain categories of people who could carry concealed handguns
without a license, such as law enforcement officers, military personnel on duty, and those
engaged in the business of manufacturing, repairing, or selling firearms. Id. § 14, 47 Stat.
at 654 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 22-4514(a) (2001)).  It also allowed a person
to transport a handgun “unloaded and in a secure wrapper from the place of purchase to
his home or place of business,” or from an old home or office to a new one. Id. § 5, 47
Stat. at 651 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 22-4505(a) (2001)).
168. See Bsharah v. United States, 646 A.2d 993, 996 n.12 (D.C. 1994) (explaining that
licenses had not been issued for many years).
169. Act of Nov. 4, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-182, 57 Stat. 586 (codified as amended at D.C.
CODE § 22-4504(a) (2001)).
170. See Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J.
LEGAL STUD. 133, 147–48 (1975).
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the United States.171  In July 1968, the council promulgated regula-
tions tightening the existing controls on guns.172  The new regulations
subjected rifles and shotguns to the licensing requirements already
applied to handguns, and the council created a new registration sys-
tem under which the District government would maintain records
identifying the current owner of every firearm legally possessed within
the District.173
Greater home rule authority in the District soon led to adoption
of even stricter gun control measures.  Congress passed a law giving
District residents the right to elect their own local government offi-
cials, including a new Council of the District of Columbia to serve as
the District’s primary legislative body.174  Congress retained the power
to review the Council’s enactments and to pass resolutions overruling
them.175
Within a few months after taking office at the beginning of
1975,176 members of the newly elected D.C. Council began proposing
a complete ban on handguns within the District.177  Although a major-
ity of the Council apparently favored such a ban, the Council ulti-
mately settled on a somewhat less restrictive proposal based on
“considerations of constitutional law, budget impact, and political
feasibility.”178
The Firearms Control Regulations Act, adopted by the Council in
the summer of 1976, essentially instituted a freeze on handgun owner-
ship and possession in the District of Columbia.179  Those who owned
and had validly registered handguns in the District before the 1976
171. Council of the District of Columbia, History of Self-Government in the District of
Columbia, http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/history.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2008).
172. See Md. & D.C. Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Washington, 442 F.2d 123, 125 & n.1, 129
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (describing then-current D.C. police regulations).
173. Id. at 125, 129.
174. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-198, §§ 401–404, 87 Stat. 774, 785–88; Council of the District of Columbia, supra
note 171. R
175. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act,
§ 602(c), 87 Stat. at 814.
176. See id. § 771(c), 87 Stat. at 836 (explaining that the portions of the Act pertaining
to the Council took effect in 1975).
177. Edward D. Jones, III, The District of Columbia’s “Firearms Control Regulations Act of
1975”: The Toughest Handgun Control Law in the United States—Or Is It?, 455 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 138, 141–42 & n.13 (1981).
178. Id. at 142.
179. See D.C. Law 1-85, 23 D.C. Reg. 2464 (1976); McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d
744, 753–54 (D.C. 1978) (explaining that the purpose of the Act was to “freeze” the hand-
gun population).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 28 28-APR-08 7:13
538 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:511
law took effect could keep those weapons if they re-registered them
within sixty days.180  Aside from a few minor exceptions such as for law
enforcement and military personnel, no one else in the District could
legally acquire or possess a handgun.181  The Council anticipated that
the number of legal handguns in the District would gradually decline
over time as the pool of residents with registered handguns died,
moved away, or opted to turn in their weapons to the police.182
The new law was a bit less restrictive with respect to long guns.
Rifles and shotguns validly registered before the 1976 law took effect
could be re-registered and retained under the “grandfather” provi-
sion, just like handguns, but the new law also permitted possession of
other rifles and shotguns if registered immediately after being
brought into the District.183  To the extent a D.C. resident wanted to
purchase a rifle or shotgun from a gun dealer, the purchase would
have to be made from one operating in the District.184  The number
of dealers in the District dwindled, however, because of stricter dealer
licensing requirements, higher license fees, and the ban on sales of
new handguns under the 1976 law.185  Within five years after adoption
of the new law, only five gun dealers remained in business in the
District.186
On top of those significant limits, the 1976 law prescribed de-
tailed requirements for the registration process.187  For example, it
required applicants to submit photographs and fingerprints188 and to
take a vision test189 and a written test demonstrating knowledge of
D.C. gun laws and safe and responsible use of firearms.190  The Dis-
180. D.C. CODE §§ 7-2502.01, 7-2502.02, 7-2502.06 (2001).
181. Id. § 7-2502.01(b) (Supp. 2007) (providing exceptions for law enforcement and
military personnel while on duty, licensed gun dealers, and non-District residents on their
way to or from lawful recreational firearm-related activity in the District).
182. Jones, supra note 177, at 143. R
183. See D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02(a) (2001) (prohibiting registration of four categories of
firearms—“[s]awed-off shotgun[s],” “[m]achine gun[s],” “[s]hort-barreled rifle[s],” and
“[p]istol[s]” not registered before September 24, 1976—but permitting registration of
other firearms including other rifles and shotguns); id. § 7-2502.06(a) (requiring that “an
application for registration shall be filed immediately after a firearm is brought into the
District”); Jones, supra note 177, at 139.  As of 2004, D.C. residents had registered over R
100,000 guns, mostly rifles and shotguns, with D.C. police.  150 CONG. REC. H7749 (daily
ed. Sept. 29, 2004) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
184. Jones, supra note 177, at 139 n.3. R
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See D.C. CODE § 7-2502.03 (2001).
188. Id. § 7-2502.04.
189. Id. § 7-2502.03(a)(11).
190. Id. § 7-2502.03(a)(10).
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trict’s 1976 statute also went beyond federal law in some respects in its
list of characteristics disqualifying people from acquiring guns.  For
example, it prohibited access to guns for those committed to mental
hospitals within the past five years, even if the commitment was volun-
tary,191 and it prohibited gun possession by anyone who had been
found to have been negligent in a past firearm accident causing death
or serious injury to someone.192
Finally, even those who could have guns under the new D.C. law
were subject to significant new responsibilities.  Except for guns be-
longing to law enforcement officers, guns being stored at a place of
business, and guns being used for lawful recreational purposes, the
D.C. law required each firearm to be stored “unloaded and disassem-
bled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device.”193  In other words,
to the extent that D.C. residents could possess guns under the 1976
law, the law required them to keep those guns unloaded and disassem-
bled or locked at all times when stored within their homes.  The D.C.
Council adopted the storage restrictions after extensive discussion of
their potential for preventing accidental shootings, such as by chil-
dren finding and playing with guns in their homes, and shootings by
otherwise law-abiding citizens in moments of sudden impulse or
passion.194
Attempts to block the new law failed in the courts195 and Con-
gress.196  To some, the District’s gun laws seemed “draconian” and “ty-
191. Id. § 7-2502.03(a)(6).  Federal law disqualifies only those involuntarily committed
or adjudicated mentally incompetent. See infra notes 272–273 and accompanying text. R
192. D.C. CODE § 7-2502.03(a)(8).
193. Id. § 7-2507.02.  In addition, the law required a gun owner to report immediately to
the police any loss, theft, or destruction of the firearm. Id. § 7-2502.08(1)(A).
194. Brief of Appellee at 3–4, 17, Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (No. 04-7041).
195. See McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 758 (D.C. 1978) (holding that the Dis-
trict’s Firearms Control Regulations Act was within the authority of D.C. Council, was not
preempted by federal statutes, and did not violate the U.S. Constitution).  Although the
new gun law initially took effect on September 24, 1976, a judge enjoined enforcement of
the new gun law in December 1976, and that injunction remained in place until an appel-
late court lifted it in February 1977. Id. at 747; Jones, supra note 177, at 141. R
196. Although some in Congress were uneasy about the new gun law approved by the
D.C. Council, congressional leaders were not eager to bring attention to a controversial
issue like gun control during an election year. See Jones, supra note 177, at 140–41 (ex- R
plaining that “because of election year unease, subsequent attempts . . . to disapprove the
Firearms Control Regulations Act were not permitted by the leadership to come to a
vote”).  Resolutions to nullify the D.C. Council’s enactment were introduced in the U.S.
House of Representatives but did not pass. See 122 CONG. REC. 19, 24471 (1976) (“A reso-
lution to disapprove the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975”); 122 CONG. REC. 20,
24816 (1976).  Shortly before the District’s new law was set to take effect, Congress
amended its grant of home rule authority to the District in an apparent attempt to deprive
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rannical,”197 while to others they were “sensible” and “reasonable.”198
However characterized, the D.C. gun control regime was unusually re-
strictive compared to laws in place throughout the rest of the country
and therefore sparked an intense debate among criminologists seek-
ing to assess its effects.
The staff of the United States Conference of Mayors conducted
the first evaluation of the new D.C. gun law based on crime statis-
tics.199  Looking at data on murders, robberies, and aggravated as-
saults over the period from 1974 to 1979 (three years before and after
the new law took effect) and comparing the District’s numbers to
those for control groups including several cities of similar size, the
Conference of Mayors concluded that the D.C. law resulted in a signif-
icant drop in firearm crime in general, and handgun crime in
particular.200
Likewise, a study by University of Maryland criminologists evalu-
ated data on firearm deaths from 1968 to 1987 and found that in the
District “there was an abrupt decline in both suicides and homicides
by firearms that coincided with the implementation” of the 1976 law,
while no similar reductions had occurred in adjacent metropolitan ar-
eas in Maryland and Virginia.201  They estimated that the 1976 law
prevented an average of forty-seven deaths each year.202
the D.C. Council of power to revise the District’s gun laws, see Act of Sept. 7, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-402, 90 Stat. 1220 (1976) (increasing the length of time that the D.C. Council had
to wait before revising its criminal laws), but that effort did not have the desired effect, see
McIntosh, 395 A.2d at 750 n.12 (rejecting the argument that a subsequent Congress’s revi-
sion of the District’s home rule authority indicated that a predecessor Congress meant to
foreclose enactment of the Firearms Control Regulations Act); Jones, supra note 177, at R
140 (noting that the revision of the District’s home rule authority “did not include a retro-
activity provision” and therefore did not nullify the Firearms Control Regulations Act).
197. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. H7765 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2004) (statement of Rep. Brown-
Waite) (urging her colleagues to “end[ ] the tyrannical reign of D.C.’s repressive gun-
control laws”); id. at H7772 (statement of Rep. Paul); Halbrook, supra note 153, at 115 R
(referring to the D.C. Council’s firearms prohibitions as “draconian”).
198. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed., A Well-Regulated Right to Bear Arms, WASH.
POST, Mar. 14, 2007, at A15 (claiming that the gun ban is “a reasonable way of achieving
the government’s legitimate goal of decreasing gun violence”); Editorial, Targeting D.C.
Gun Laws, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2005, at A18 (calling the D.C. Council’s gun safety law
“sensible and broadly supported”).
199. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE ANALYSIS OF THE FIREARMS CONTROL ACT OF 1975:
HANDGUN CONTROL IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1980).
200. Id. at 17.
201. Colin Loftin et al., Effects of Restrictive Licensing of Handguns on Homicide and Suicide
in the District of Columbia, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1615, 1618 (1991).
202. Id. at 1620.
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Others remained skeptical and questioned the validity of these
statistical analyses.203  They claimed that the studies had selected inap-
propriate cities or regions as controls with which to compare the Dis-
trict,204 did not account for more aggressive law enforcement tactics
in the District that may have reduced crime rates,205 did not consider
the effect of advances in emergency and surgical care for gunshot vic-
tims,206 and ignored beneficial uses of firearms such as deterring or
defending against criminal attacks.207  They asserted that crime was
declining in the District even before the 1976 gun control law took
effect, and that this downward trend merely continued and gave the
false appearance that the new law lowered crime rates.208  They que-
ried how the D.C. gun law could have produced an abrupt decrease in
crime, rather than a gradual decline, given that the law froze the ex-
isting stock of handguns in the city, rather than banning handguns
completely.209  Some went even further, accusing the Maryland re-
203. See Paul H. Blackman, Letter to the Editor, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1157, 1157 (1992)
(arguing that the Loftin et al. study “misleadingly suggests a post-law decline in homi-
cide”); Chester L. Britt et al., A Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law: Some Cautionary Notes on the
Use of Interrupted Time Series Designs for Policy Impact Assessment, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 361, 376
(1996) (finding that the D.C. gun law had little to no effect on monthly homicides in
D.C.); Eric S.H. Ching, Letter to the Editor, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1158, 1159 (1992)
(arguing that the effect of the gun law was “nonexistent”); Robert Eilers, Letter to the
Editor, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1158 (1992) (calling into question Loftin et al.’s findings on
reduced suicide rates); Jones, supra note 177, at 144–49 (calling into question the U.S. R
Conference of Mayors’ findings); Gary Kleck et al., The Emperor Has No Clothes: Using Inter-
rupted Time Series Designs to Evaluate Social Policy Impact, 12 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 197, 233
(2000) (describing the Loftin et al. study’s approach as “‘subscientific’”); Srinivas M. Sastry
et al., Letter to the Editor, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1159 (1992) (calling into question the
adequacy and appropriateness of the Loftin et al. study); Timothy Wells, Letter to the
Editor, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1158 (1992) (same).  The authors of the District of Columbia
study responded to some of these critiques. See Colin Loftin et al., Letter to the Editor, 326
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1160 (1992); David McDowall et al., Using Quasi-Experiments to Evaluate
Firearm Laws: Comment on Britt et al.’s Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
381, 390 (1996).
204. Blackman, supra note 203, at 1157; Britt et al., supra note 203, at 365–66; Jones, R
supra note 177, at 146–47; Kleck et al., supra note 203, at 203, 225–26. R
205. Jones, supra note 177, at 144–45; Kleck et al., supra note 203, at 211. R
206. Sastry et al., supra note 203, at 1159. R
207. E.g., Ching, supra note 203, at 1158. R
208. Blackman, supra note 203, at 1157; see also Chester L. Britt et al., Avoidance and R
Misunderstanding: A Rejoinder to McDowall et al., 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 393, 395 (1996)
(“Clearly, monthly homicides dropped in D.C. in the mid-1970s, but these results suggest
to us that something other than the gun law was responsible for the observed decline.”).
209. Blackman, supra note 203, at 1157; Kleck et al., supra note 203, at 209; Daniel D. R
Polsby, Firearms Costs, Firearms Benefits and the Limits of Knowledge, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY, 207, 212 (1995); see Britt et al., supra note 203, at 368–70 (noting that the D.C. gun R
ban was designed to have a gradual effect, and criticizing Loftin et al.’s study for assuming,
without adequate support, that the gun ban was responsible for the decrease in
homicides).
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searchers of dishonestly slanting their studies to support anti-gun
biases.210
Critics of the D.C. gun law also argued that it was simply implausi-
ble that the District’s restrictions on access to guns could significantly
reduce crime because the law was too easy to circumvent.  Demand for
guns for criminal purposes remained high despite the D.C. law, and a
vast quantity of illegal guns flowed into the District from neighboring
states.211  Geography exacerbated the problem, since the District of
Columbia covers only about sixty-one square miles of land and “no
point is more than five miles from the nearest border with Virginia or
Maryland.”212  Indeed, ATF data indicated that even before the 1976
law, over eighty percent of the firearms recovered by law enforcement
in the District and traced in connection with criminal investigations
originated outside the District.213  The NRA thus insisted that the new
law could not possibly reduce crime in the District because “criminals
would ignore the requirements of the Act and acquire handguns if
they so chose.”214
Even supporters of the D.C. law agreed that its effectiveness inevi-
tably would be undercut significantly by the fact that surrounding ju-
risdictions have much weaker gun control laws.  Indeed, when D.C.
Council members debated in 1976 whether to adopt the new, stricter
gun laws, they “were mindful of the fact that the proposed possession
requirements generally would have more of an impact on law-abiding
firearm owners than criminal users.”215  They nevertheless favored
tough restrictions because they could potentially prevent incidents of
law-abiding citizens using easily accessible handguns spontaneously in
arguments or accidentally.216  In other words, D.C. Council members
realized the new laws were not going to disarm completely the city’s
210. See Blackman, supra note 203, at 1158 (arguing that “the District of Columbia gun R
law can look effective only to gun control’s true believers”); Britt et al., supra note 203, at R
378 (expressing hope that researchers will resist temptations to skirt issues casting doubt
on efficacy of politically controversial policies such as gun control); Kleck et al., supra note
203, at 231–32 (suggesting that the statistical analyses used to examine the effects of D.C. R
gun laws are “so flexible, so manipulable, that one can obtain almost any results one
likes”).
211. See infra notes 218–220 and accompanying text. R
212. Kleck et al., supra note 203, at 224. R
213. Jones, supra note 177, at 145 (citing BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO & FIREARMS, R
U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CONCENTRATED URBAN ENFORCEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INITIAL
YEAR OF OPERATION CUE IN THE CITIES OF WASHINGTON, D.C.; BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS;
AND CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 107 (1978)).
214. Id. at 143–44.
215. Id. at 142.
216. Id.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 33 28-APR-08 7:13
2008] THE FUTURE OF GUN CONTROL 543
hardcore criminal population, but nevertheless hoped the laws would
have beneficial effects.
After the law took effect, its enforcers and supporters continued
to acknowledge that it was bound to be undermined to some degree
by an influx of guns from other jurisdictions.  For example, when the
Conference of Mayors issued its report in 1980 claiming that the D.C.
law had reduced gun violence in the city, the District’s own police
questioned the findings.217  A police department spokesperson noted
that handguns could be obtained easily in neighboring states and said
that “less than 1 percent of all firearms confiscated each year by police
are registered here or elsewhere, ‘so somehow or other, the illegal
guns are still getting in here.’”218  Likewise, an official from the Na-
tional Council to Control Handguns (now the Brady Campaign to Pre-
vent Gun Violence)219 explained that the District’s gun laws were
tough, but that “the laws are less restrictive in Virginia and Maryland,”
and “[t]hat results in ‘leakage’ into Washington of guns purchased in
those states, illustrating the need for uniform, national gun control
legislation.”220
The debate took a sad turn as firearm homicide rates increased
dramatically in the District at the end of the 1980s and into the
1990s.221  Supporters of the D.C. gun laws attributed the soaring death
toll to an epidemic of deadly violence associated with crack cocaine
that would have been even worse but for the District’s tough gun
217. Id. at 143–44.
218. Paul W. Valentine, Study Cites Decline over Last 3 Years in Handgun Crime; Three-Year
Drop Cited in D.C. Handgun Crime, WASH. POST, June 29, 1980, at B1.  In 2005, the Mayor of
the District of Columbia testified that the District’s gun laws are important, but “[b]ecause
of the porous nature of our borders, we can never rely on laws alone to keep guns out of
our city.” Under Fire: Does the District of Columbia’s Gun Ban Help or Hurt the Fight Against
Crime?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 45 (2005) (statement
of Anthony Williams, Mayor of the District of Columbia).
219. Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, About the Brady Campaign, http://
www.bradycampaign.org/about/history.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2008).
220. Laura A. Kiernan, D.C. Appeals Court Upholds City’s Tough Gun Control Law; Court
Upholds City’s Gun Control Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1978, at A1 (quoting Charles Orasin,
Executive Vice President of the National Council to Control Handguns); see also Eilers,
supra note 203, at 1158 (arguing that “even a tough gun law like the one in Washington[,] R
D.C.” is inadequate in preventing the illegal flow of guns from neighboring states and that
“only a strong federal law restricting or banning handguns can make a noteworthy and
lasting impact on the epidemic of violence in our urban areas”).
221. Eilers, supra note 203, at 1158; Sastry et al., supra note 203, at 1159. R
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laws.222  Opponents of gun control saw the increase in homicides as
confirmation of the D.C. gun laws’ ineffectiveness.223
As the homicide rate surged upward, Virginia was the largest
source of guns illegally flowing into the District of Columbia.224  Em-
barrassed by its reputation as a favored shopping place for gun traf-
fickers, Virginia enacted a law in 1993 allowing a person, who is not a
licensed dealer, to purchase no more than one handgun in any thirty-
day period.225  Much of the gun trafficking activity previously originat-
ing in Virginia simply shifted over to Maryland,226 and when Maryland
passed a similar law prohibiting the purchase of more than one hand-
gun per month,227 “the gun runners simply moved a few states south,
to Georgia, where no such rationing is practiced.”228  With the
strength of state laws varying widely, the D.C. gun laws thus remain
vulnerable to being undercut by trafficking of guns from other
jurisdictions.229
In recent years, gun rights advocates stepped up their opposition
to the D.C. laws.230  Strict gun laws remain popular with most D.C.
residents and city leaders and thus it is not likely that the D.C. Council
222. Loftin et al., supra note 201, at 1620; see also McDowall et al., supra note 203, at 390 R
(“Firearm homicides in the District were visibly lower for more than 10 years after the
licensing law began.  The later rise in killings shows that this drop was not unalterable.”).
223. See Blackman, supra note 203, at 1157 (noting “the District of Columbia’s recent R
record-setting years for homicide”); see also Britt et al., supra note 203, at 370–71 (highlight- R
ing the fact that, although any decrease in homicide rates attributable to the D.C. gun ban
should have been apparent many years after the enactment of the ban, this is precisely
when homicide rates in the D.C. area began to increase); Wells, supra note 203, at 1158 R
(proposing that recent increases in homicides suggest that any effect of the gun ban was
only temporary, that criminals have found ways around the ban, and that the ban increases
law-abiding citizens’ vulnerability to violent crimes by disarming them).
224. See Cathy Lanier & Vincent Schiraldi, Op-Ed., Give Us Back Our Gun Law, WASH.
POST, Mar. 15, 2007, at A19 (noting that in spite of D.C.’s tough gun laws, guns flowing in
from neighboring states fueled illegal sales in D.C. and that Virginia “was the No. 1 sup-
plier of guns seized in crimes in the District”).
225. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2(P) (Supp. 2007); B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Virginia
Aims to Shed Image as a ‘Handgun Supermarket,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1992, at A16.
226. See OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, GUN CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE
SURVEY OF STATE FIREARM LAWS 5 (2000) (noting that after Virginia passed its one-gun-a-
month law, Maryland “became the main source of crime guns in Washington, D.C.”), avail-
able at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles_publications/publications/gun_
report_20000401/GunReport.pdf.
227. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-128 (LexisNexis 2003).
228. Polsby, supra note 209, at 219–20. R
229. See OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, supra note 226, at 5 (“Very strict gun laws in one state R
can be undermined by permissive laws in neighboring states.”).
230. Editorial, Targeting D.C. Gun Laws, supra note 198 (discussing the recent legislative R
push to repeal D.C. gun restrictions).
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will drastically cut restrictions on guns.231  As a result, critics of the
D.C. gun laws have aimed their pleas at the United States Congress.232
The House of Representatives voted several times to repeal the Dis-
trict’s gun control laws, but the Senate never followed suit.233
In the midst of the continuing struggle over the issue in Con-
gress, the D.C. Circuit rendered its decision striking down several ele-
ments of the District’s gun laws as violations of the Second
Amendment.234  The plaintiffs in the case were D.C. residents who as-
serted that they wanted to keep guns in their homes for protection
against criminal attacks, but that they could not do so because of the
D.C. laws preventing them from having handguns and requiring rifles
and shotguns to be stored unloaded and locked away.235
A federal district court judge dismissed the case, observing that
an overwhelming body of precedent rejects the notion that there is an
individual right to keep and bear arms apart from service in a well-
regulated militia.236  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit panel reversed, em-
bracing the minority view on the Second Amendment’s meaning and
231. See, e.g., Jesse Jackson, Op-Ed., Activist Judge Takes Aim at Gun Law, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Mar. 13, 2007, at 23 (contending that the recent D.C. Circuit decision striking down the
D.C. gun laws undermines the wishes of D.C. legislators and the citizens themselves); Edito-
rial, Targeting D.C. Gun Laws, supra note 198 (noting that every D.C. mayor and D.C. Coun- R
cil member has supported D.C. gun restrictions).
232. Editorial, Targeting D.C. Gun Laws, supra note 198 (describing how the NRA is join- R
ing forces with members of Congress to pass a bill that would allow D.C. residents to store
assembled guns in their homes, in spite of opposition from local authorities).
233. See 151 CONG. REC. H5501-04, H5512 (daily ed. June 30, 2005) (voting 259 to 161 to
prohibit any funds appropriated to the District of Columbia from being used to enforce
the law requiring guns in homes to be kept unloaded and locked); 150 CONG. REC. H7776-
77 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2004) (voting 250 to 171 in favor of a statute repealing significant
portions of the D.C. gun laws).  In March 2007, when leaders of the new Democratic major-
ity in the U.S. House of Representatives pushed a bill that would grant congressional vot-
ing rights to D.C. residents, opponents attached an amendment that would repeal the
District’s gun laws, prompting the Democratic leaders to drop their pursuit of the bill. See
153 CONG. REC. H2860-63 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2007); H.R. REP. NO. 110-63, at 4 (2007); see
also Tory Newmyer, NRA Offers Whiff of Gunpowder, ROLL CALL, Mar. 26, 2007 (describing
how House Republicans derailed a D.C. voting rights bill by adding provision that would
eviscerate D.C. gun laws), available at 2007 WLNR 5658227.
234. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 401 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007).
235. Parker, 478 F.3d at 373–74; see Paul Duggan, Lawyer Who Wiped Out D.C. Ban Says It’s
About Liberties, Not Guns, WASH. POST, MAR. 18, 2007, at A1 (noting that the driving force
behind the lawsuit was Robert Levy, a wealthy entrepreneur who had no interest in having
a gun but felt that the D.C. gun laws unduly infringed personal freedoms).
236. Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2004), rev’d, 478
F.3d 370.
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concluding that it provides, at a minimum, a right to keep guns at
home for protection.237
While having an undeniably significant impact on the debate
over the Second Amendment, the actual effect of the D.C. Circuit de-
cision was carefully limited.  The decision was not a wholesale invalida-
tion of the District’s gun laws.238  Instead, the court essentially ruled
that the D.C. laws went too far in two respects.  First, the court con-
cluded that the District violated the Second Amendment to the extent
that it effectively banned possession of handguns for everyone who
did not have a handgun already registered before the 1976 law took
effect.239  Second, the court struck down the District’s requirement
that guns in homes be stored unloaded and disassembled or locked
up.240  In other words, the court ruled that the District must allow its
residents to have handguns, as well as rifles and shotguns, in their
homes, with the option to keep them loaded, unlocked, and ready to
be fired.
The District of Columbia persuaded the United States Supreme
Court to review the case, a move welcomed by gun rights advocates
hoping for a landmark ruling affirming their view of the Second
Amendment’s scope and effect.241  Even if the Supreme Court does
not reverse the decision below, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling leaves the Dis-
trict with gun laws that are still among the nation’s strongest.242  While
237. Parker, 478 F.3d at 395, 400–01.  The decision marked only the second time that a
federal appellate court has interpreted the Second Amendment broadly to protect posses-
sion and use of guns having no relation to organized, public, military activity. See id. at 380
(noting that, up to that point, “[o]nly the Fifth Circuit ha[d] interpreted the Second
Amendment to protect an individual right”).  The first was in United States v. Emerson, 270
F.3d 203, 232 (5th Cir. 2001).  In its opinion in Parker, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that
it was taking the minority view on the issue, rejecting the approach taken by the majority of
federal and state appellate courts.  478 F.3d at 380 & nn.4–6.
238. Plaintiffs emphasized that they were not challenging “the totality of the city’s gun
control laws” and that the relief sought was “exceedingly narrow.”  Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Parker v.
District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 03-CV-0213-EGS).
239. Parker, 478 F.3d at 399–400 (invalidating D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001)).
The court also struck down two provisions of the gun law enacted by Congress in 1932 to
the extent that they could be construed as prohibiting the movement of a legally registered
handgun from room to room within one’s own house. Id. at 400 (invalidating D.C. CODE
§§ 22-4504, 22-4506 (2001)).
240. Id. at 400–01 (invalidating D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2001)).
241. David Nakamura, D.C. Wants High Court to Hear Gun Case; City Defending Restrictive
Law, WASH. POST, July 17, 2007, at A1.
242. Indeed, the plaintiffs in Parker argued that should they prevail in their lawsuit, “the
District of Columbia would still be left with what is arguably the Nation’s strictest gun
control regime.”  Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Summary Judgment, supra note 238, at 1; see also 150 CONG. REC. H7767 (daily ed. Sept. R
29, 2004) (statement of Rep. Souder) (asserting that D.C. gun laws “would still be far more
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District residents would be able to legally possess handguns or long
guns for defense in their homes, those firearms would remain subject
to the District’s gun registration system, one of the strictest in the
country.243  D.C. law continues to prohibit carrying of guns, whether
concealed or not, in public or in automobiles.244  Automatic weapons,
heavily regulated by federal law but still otherwise generally legally
available to civilians throughout the United States,245 remain banned
in the District of Columbia.246  While large-capacity ammunition
magazines are legal again in the rest of the country after the expira-
tion of a federal statute that banned them from 1994 to 2004,247 D.C.
law retains its ban on all semi-automatic firearms capable of firing
more than twelve shots without reloading.248  Another D.C. statute,
the only one of its kind in the country,249 makes manufacturers, im-
porters, and dealers of military-style assault weapons, automatic weap-
ons, and firearms with high-capacity ammunition magazines strictly
liable for any bodily injuries or deaths resulting from use of such
weapons in the District.250  Stringent gun dealer licensing require-
restrictive than the laws of most states” even if Congress passed proposed repeal of some
portions of those laws).
243. See D.C. CODE §§ 7-2502.01 to -2502.10 (2001); Parker, 478 F.3d at 374 (noting that
plaintiffs did not challenge the District’s authority to require registration of firearms).
244. D.C. CODE §§ 22-4504, 22-4506 (2001); Parker, 478 F.3d at 374 (noting that plain-
tiffs did not assert any legal right to carry guns outside their homes); id. at 400 (“[W]e
need not consider the more difficult issue whether the District can ban the carrying of
handguns in public, or in automobiles.”).
245. See Rostron, supra note 158, at 1428–34 (describing the regulation of such weapons R
under the National Firearms Act).
246. See D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(10)(A), 7-2502.02(a)(2) (2001).
247. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(31)(A), 922(w) (repealed 2004).  These provisions were en-
acted in 1994 with a ten-year “sunset” term that expired in 2004.  Public Safety and Recrea-
tional Firearms Use Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110105, 108 Stat. 1996, 2000
(1994).
248. D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(10)(B), 7-2502.02(a)(2).  The D.C. statute bans any fire-
arm “which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily converted or restored to shoot”
more than twelve rounds without manually reloading. Id.  The statute could quite plausi-
bly be read as prohibiting virtually all semi-automatic firearms, because a magazine holding
more than a dozen rounds could be inserted into any firearm that can accept a detachable
magazine. See Eugene Volokh, Why Congress Should Pre-empt Most Lawsuits Against Gun Man-
ufacturers, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Apr. 21, 2005, http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2005_
04_17-2005_04_23.shtml (“[T]he only ‘conversion’ required is simply slapping in the big-
ger magazine.”).
249. See Rae Theodore, Gun Makers Say D.C. Liability Ruling Could Affect All Products Cases,
FINDLAW, Aug. 9, 2005, http://news.lp.findlaw.com/andrews/pl/gun/20050809/2005
0809beretta.html.
250. D.C. CODE §§ 7-2551.01 to -2551.03; see District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A.,
Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 655–59 (D.C. 2005) (rejecting constitutional challenges to the Dis-
trict’s Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act of 1990).
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ments251 and restrictions on ammunition sales252 also remain in place,
along with a forty-eight hour waiting period for obtaining a
handgun.253
The constitutional litigation thus threatens to take away signifi-
cant pieces of the District of Columbia’s uniquely strict system of gun
control regulations, but it does not fundamentally alter the bigger,
overall picture.  As before, the District will continue to have some of
the strongest restrictions on access to guns of any place in the nation.
But as before, those restrictions will be undercut by the substantially
weaker laws of surrounding states and the lack of a strong, compre-
hensive national regulatory scheme.254  As the District’s police chief
put it, “we are continuing to face a serious problem with firearms be-
ing brought illegally into the District from other jurisdictions.  Unfor-
tunately, that problem is not likely to go away anytime soon.”255
C. Virginia Tech
Gun control again became a headline story in April of 2007 when
a student at Virginia Tech used two pistols to murder thirty-two peo-
ple and wound seventeen others before killing himself.256  The deadli-
est shooting spree in American history,257 it prompted outrage and
calls for reform from both opponents and proponents of gun control.
Gun rights advocates immediately blamed the tragedy on the fact
that Virginia Tech prohibited firearms on its campus.258  Within hours
of the shootings, they claimed that the university had “blood on its
251. D.C. CODE §§ 7-2504.01 to -2504.08 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
252. Id. § 7-2505.02(d) (2001) (requiring an ammunition purchaser to have a valid re-
gistration certificate for a firearm of the same caliber or gauge as the ammunition
purchased).
253. Id. § 22-4508.
254. The District of Columbia emphasized this point in a tort action that it filed against
gun manufacturers several years ago.  Complaint at 15, District of Columbia v. Beretta,
U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005) (Nos. 03-CV-24, 03-CV-38) (“[A]lmost all firearms
that are possessed and used unlawfully in the District were originally sold outside the Dis-
trict in a manner that has undermined the District’s stringent gun control laws.”).
255. Under Fire: Does the District of Columbia’s Gun Ban Help or Hurt the Fight Against Crime?:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, supra note 218, at 48 (statement of R
Charles H. Ramsey, Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department).
256. VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL, MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 1, 71 (2007),
available at http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/index.html.
257. Ian Shapira & Tom Jackman, Gunman Kills 32 at Virginia Tech in Deadliest Shooting in
U.S. History, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2007, at A1.
258. See Paul Joseph Watson & Alex Jones, Campus Gun Ban Disarmed Virginia Victims: VA
Tech Has “Blood on Its Hands” as Gun Control Advocates Milk Tragic Event, PRISON PLANET, Apr.
16, 2007,  http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/april2007/160407gunban.htm  (“A gun
ban recently enforced by Virginia Tech campus prevented over thirty victims of today’s
mass shooting from defending themselves against the killer . . . .”).
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hands” for prohibiting possession of guns by students and teachers
“who could potentially have stopped the killer in his tracks.”259
Like most states, Virginia generally allows people to obtain per-
mits to carry concealed guns.260  While placing special restrictions on
guns at certain locations, such as places of worship and elementary
and secondary schools,261 the Virginia statutes are silent on the issue
of guns at institutions of higher education.262  In the absence of any
specific statutory treatment of the subject, most colleges and universi-
ties in Virginia adopted rules prohibiting guns on their campuses.263
Even before the shootings at Virginia Tech, those bans had been
targets of criticism and controversy for several years.  Gun owners
challenged the validity of the restrictions at several schools,264 but Vir-
ginia’s attorney general issued an opinion in 2006 upholding colleges’
and universities’ authority to restrict the possession of guns on cam-
pus.265  Legislators in Virginia’s General Assembly introduced bills
that would have nullified the “no guns on campus” rules, but those
259. Id. (quoting Aaron Zelman of Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership); see
also Press Release, Gun Owners of America, Virginia Tech Shooting—Gun Bans Are the
Problem, Not the Solution (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.gunowners.org/pr0704.htm; Press
Release, Virginia Citizens Defense League, Inc., Gun-Control Claims Lives at Virginia Tech
(Apr. 16, 2007), http://www2.vcdl.org/cgi-bin/wspd_cgi.sh/vcdl/vadetail.html?RECID=
1702146&FILTER=;Press.
260. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308(D) (Supp. 2007).
261. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-283 (2004), 18.2-308.1 (Supp. 2007).
262. State legislators introduced bills in 2005 that would have spelled out the authority
of Virginia public universities to prohibit guns, but those bills did not pass. See S.B. 1343,
2005 Sess. (Va. 2005); H.B. 2897, 2005 Sess. (Va. 2005).
263. Greg Esposito, Gun Bill Gets Shot Down by Panel, ROANOKE TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at
A1; Kevin Miller, VA. Tech’s Ban on Guns May Draw Legal Fire, ROANOKE TIMES, Apr. 13,
2005, at A1.
264. See Esposito, supra note 263 (noting that some questioned Virginia Tech’s decision R
to discipline a student for bringing his gun to class despite having a concealed handgun
permit); Steven M. Janosik, Anticipating Legal Issues in Higher Education, 42 NASPA J. 401,
409–10 (2005), available at http://www.elps.vt.edu/janosik/anticipating.pdf  (discussing a
Blue Ridge Community College student’s dispute of the college’s ban on weapons); Miller,
supra note 263 (discussing both the Virginia Tech and Blue Ridge Community College R
incidents and noting challenges to James Madison University’s ban on concealed
weapons).
265. Op. Va. Att’y Gen. No. 05-078 (2006), available at http://www.oag.state.va.us/
OPINIONS/2006opns/05-078.pdf.  While the attorney general determined that Virginia
colleges and universities could not impose blanket or universal bans on carrying concealed
guns on their campuses, he took the position that schools had the authority to ban their
students and employees from possessing guns and could impose “regulation of, or under
limited circumstances, prohibition of, firearms by any persons attending events on campus,
visiting dormitories or classroom buildings, attending specific events as invitees, or under
any circumstance permitted by law.” Id.
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bills did not make it out of committee.266  In the midst of the debate
over campus rules on firearms, Virginia Tech’s governing board reaf-
firmed its policy of prohibiting guns, and a school spokesperson de-
clared that continuation of the gun ban “will help parents, students,
faculty and visitors feel safe on our campus.”267
The shootings at Virginia Tech intensified the fight over guns on
college and university campuses.  On one side, gun rights advocates
insisted that criminals would never obey rules prohibiting guns, and
therefore students and teachers should be allowed to arm themselves
to deter and defend against attacks.268  On the other side, gun control
proponents maintained that pouring more guns onto campuses would
be a foolish response to the problem of gun violence.269
Meanwhile, another aspect of the Virginia Tech incident soon
took center stage in the gun debate.  Initial reports indicated that the
shooter’s acquisition of his guns, a Walther .22-caliber pistol and a
Glock 9mm pistol, did not violate any state or federal laws.270  A few
days after the massacre, however, authorities conceded that a tragic
266. See H.B. 2300, 2007 Sess. (Va. 2007) (H.B. 2300 was left in the Committee on Mili-
tia, Police and Public Safety on Feb. 6, 2007); H.B. 1572, 2006 Sess. (Va. 2006) (H.B. 1572
was left in the Committee on Militia, Police and Public Safety on Feb. 15, 2006).
267. Esposito, supra note 263 (quoting Virginia Tech spokesman Larry Hincker) (inter- R
nal quotation marks omitted).
268. See, e.g., Robert J. Caldwell, Editorial, The Lessons from Virginia Tech; Bloodbath in a
‘Gun-Free Zone,’ SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 22, 2007, at G1; David B. Kopel, Op-Ed., ‘Gun-
Free Zones,’ WALL ST. J., Apr. 18, 2007, at A17; Tracy W. Price, Op-Ed., Anti-Gun Nonsense,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at A17; Press Release, Gun Owners of America, Aftermath of
Tragedy: GOA Defending Freedom (Apr. 17, 2007), http://www.gunowners.org/a041707
.htm; Press Release, Second Amendment Found., SAF Says Virginia Tech Case Under-
scores Importance of Second Amendment Right (Apr. 19, 2007), http://www.saf.org/view
pr-new.asp?id=220.
269. See, e.g., LEGAL ACTION PROJECT, BRADY CENTER TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, NO GUN
LEFT BEHIND: THE GUN LOBBY’S CAMPAIGN TO PUSH GUNS INTO COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS, at
vi (2007), available at http://www.bradycampaign.org/xshare/pdf/reports/no-gun-left-be-
hind.pdf (“[T]he effect of any policy to arm students and teachers will be to undermine
school safety and academic freedom and supplant it with a culture of gun carrying that is
completely foreign to those institutions.”); Richard Cohen, Editorial, Thompson on Horse-
back, WASH. POST, July 31, 2007, at A19 (implying that college kids would likely “party with
guns” if they were allowed on campus); Editorial, More Guns Won’t Solve Problem, DAILY
REVEILLE (Baton Rouge, La.), May 2, 2007, available at http://www.lsureveille.com/home/
index.cfm?event=displayArticle&uStory_id=0bdade59-d4ce-43d6-914a-eefa6e9c0a46 (“[I]t
does not make sense to have guns within easy access of . . . students.”); Op-Ed., No Guns on
Campus, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), May 9, 2007, at 7A (opining that allowing guns on
school campuses “would severely increase the danger for students”).
270. See, e.g., Mary Sanchez, Editorial, No Real Lessons Here on Gun Violence, SUN-SENTINEL
(Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Apr. 21, 2007, at 21A (“Within a few days of the incident, it was
learned that the student had obtained his guns legally.  No laws were broken that need
mending, no loophole needed to be closed.”); Brigid Schulte & Sari Horwitz, Weapons
Purchases Aroused No Suspicion, Pawnshop, Dealer Supplied Handguns, WASH. POST, Apr. 18,
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mistake occurred and that the killer was able to buy guns even though
it was illegal for him to do so.271
Federal law prohibits possession of a gun by a person “who has
been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to
a mental institution.”272  Federal regulations specify that this includes
any “determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful au-
thority” that a person suffers from a mental illness rendering him a
“danger to himself or to others” or without “mental capacity to con-
tract or manage his own affairs.”273
Sixteen months before his murderous rampage, the Virginia
Tech shooter, Seung-Hui Cho, had been “adjudicated as a mental de-
fective” within the meaning of federal law.  In December 2005, Vir-
ginia Tech police took Cho into emergency custody after receiving
reports that he had made suicidal statements and his behavior had
become bizarre and threatening to other students.274  After one night
of detention in a hospital, Cho had a commitment hearing before a
special justice who found that Cho “present[ed] an imminent danger
to himself as a result of mental illness” and directed Cho to receive
outpatient treatment.275  An hour after being discharged from the
hospital, Cho arrived at the university’s counseling center for an ap-
pointment, but the counselor cannot recall Cho’s visit, the counselor’s
report on the visit is missing, and Cho did not make a follow-up ap-
pointment and never returned to the counseling center.276
The special justice’s finding meant that federal law barred Cho
from purchasing or owning a gun.  Cho nevertheless passed back-
2007, at A13 (describing how Cho Seung Hui purchased the two guns he used in the
Virginia Tech shootings and stating that “[b]oth transactions were legal”).
271. See Michael Luo, U.S. Rules Made Killer Ineligible to Purchase Gun, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,
2007, at A1 (stating that Cho should have been prohibited from purchasing a gun under
federal law because in 2005 a Virginia court had “declared him to be mentally ill and an
imminent danger to himself”).
272. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), (s)(3)(B)(iv) (2000); see also Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, Dept. of the Treasury, ATF Form 4473, available at http://www.atf.gov/
forms/4473/index.htm (questioning whether an applicant has “been adjudicated mentally
defective” or “committed to a mental institution”).  The federal prohibition technically
applies only to guns shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or possessed “in or affect-
ing” interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), but that covers virtually all
firearms.
273. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11(a) (2007).
274. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL RETARDATION &
SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES, INVESTIGATION OF APRIL 16, 2007 CRITICAL INCIDENT AT VIRGINIA
TECH 5–7 (2007), available at http://www.oig.virginia.gov/documents/VATechRpt-140
.pdf.
275. Id. at 11.
276. VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 256, at 49. R
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ground checks when he sought to obtain firearms early in 2007 be-
cause no record of the special justice’s ruling existed in the databases
of the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS)
maintained by the FBI.277  Although Virginia provides to NICS the
names of people disqualified by mental illness from having guns, Vir-
ginia authorities did not submit Cho’s name, apparently because of
confusion created by small differences in the wording of state and fed-
eral law.278  While the federal regulations disqualify those found to
pose a danger to themselves or others because of mental illness,279
Virginia has its own statute on guns and mental illness, which disquali-
fies only those adjudicated “legally incompetent” or “mentally inca-
pacitated.”280  While Virginia law did not disqualify Cho from having a
gun because he was never declared incompetent or incapacitated, fed-
eral law disqualified him, and Virginia therefore should have submit-
ted his name for inclusion in the NICS databases.281
Revelation of how the Virginia Tech shooter slipped through a
small crack in the firearm laws suddenly created intense new interest
in improving the records used for background checks.  Representative
Carolyn McCarthy, elected to Congress after a gunman killed her hus-
band and wounded her son during a mass shooting on a Long Island
Rail Road commuter train, had been trying for years to push through
legislation to fund improvements to the NICS system.282  In particular,
McCarthy emphasized the fact that the NICS databases included only
a small portion of those disqualified from having guns on mental ill-
ness grounds.283  Less than half the states have ever provided to NICS
any information about mental health adjudications and commit-
277. See Luo, supra note 271. R
278. 153 CONG. REC. H6344-45 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Rep. Boucher);
VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 256, at 71–73. R
279. See supra notes 272–273 and accompanying text. R
280. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.1:2 (2004).
281. Two weeks after the shootings, Virginia’s governor issued an executive order ex-
panding the state’s reporting of mental health information to include those, like Cho,
adjudicated mentally ill and dangerous but directed to receive only outpatient treatment.
See Va. Exec. Order 50 (2007), available at http://www.governor.virginia.gov/Initiatives/
ExecutiveOrders/2007/EO_50.cfm.
282. See H.R. 297, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1415, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 3237, 108th
Cong. (2003).
283. See Mental-Health Data Not in Gun Files, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 27, 2005, at A18
(noting that Rep. McCarthy introduced the legislation to “close the gaps in the back-
ground-check system”); Rep. Dingell: National Instant Criminal Background System Improve-
ments Will Benefit Both Lawful Gun Owners, Law Enforcement, U.S. FED. NEWS, Dec. 19, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 25188024 (discussing how the shortcomings of the NICS System in
preventing guns from being sold to the mentally ill motivated Rep. McCarthy to introduce
such legislation).
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ments, and only four states regularly report that information.284  The
rest, blocked by state-law privacy restrictions or simply not having
mechanisms in place to process and provide the information, submit
no mental health records at all.285  One study estimated that more
than ninety percent of disqualifying mental health records are not in-
cluded in the background check system.286  Millions of other records
that would disqualify gun purchasers, including information about
criminal charges and restraining orders, have also never been put into
NICS databases.287  During the last two sessions of Congress, McCar-
thy’s bills seeking to improve records gathering for NICS passed the
House, but then died in the Senate.288
Before the Virginia Tech shootings, the NRA expressed support
for the concept of improving the NICS database, but was not inter-
ested in backing anything proposed by an outspoken gun control ad-
vocate like McCarthy and did not take a position on her bills.289  A few
days after the tragic events at Virginia Tech, the NRA began negotiat-
ing with Democratic congressional leaders.290  Representative John
Dingell, the senior Democrat in the United States House of Repre-
sentatives and a former NRA board member, led the push to reach a
compromise on a modified version of McCarthy’s bill.291
In less than two months, legislators and interest groups from both
sides of the gun control debate hammered out a satisfactory compro-
mise.292  The measure, dubbed the NICS Improvement Amendments
Act, sailed through the House of Representatives, passing on a voice
284. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DEP’T OF EDUC. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT ON ISSUES RAISED BY THE VIRGINIA TECH TRAGEDY 10 (2007), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/vtreport.html [hereinafter REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT]; Open Letter
from Michael J. Sullivan, Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explo-
sives, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the States’ Attorneys General (May 9, 2007), available at
http://www.atf.gov/press/2007press/050907open-letter-to-states-attorneys-general.htm.
285. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 284, at 10. R
286. JIM KESSLER, THIRD WAY CULTURE PROJECT, MISSING RECORDS: HOLES IN BACK-
GROUND CHECK SYSTEM ALLOW ILLEGAL BUYERS TO GET GUNS 3, 7 (2007), available at http://
www.third-way.com/data/product/file/86/Third_Way_Missing_Records_Report.pdf.
287. Pub. L. No. 110-180, § 2(4)-(5), 122 Stat. 2559, 2560 (2008).
288. Jonathan Weisman, Dingell, NRA Working on Bill to Strengthen Background Checks,
WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2007, at A10.
289. See Mental-Health Data Not in Gun Files, supra note 283, (noting that while the NRA R
supports improving the background-check system, “it has not taken a position on McCar-
thy’s legislation”); Weisman, supra note 288 (describing how the gun lobby stayed relatively R
neutral during efforts to pass the legislation).
290. Weisman, supra note 288. R
291. Id.
292. Jonathan Weisman, Democrats, NRA Reach Deal on Background-Check Bill, WASH. POST,
June 10, 2007, at A2.
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vote just two days after its introduction,293 with only maverick,
staunchly libertarian congressman and presidential candidate Ron
Paul speaking against it.294
The measure took longer to make its way through the Senate, but
again faced opposition only from one legislator.295  Senator Tom
Coburn of Oklahoma placed a hold on the bill, preventing it from
being brought to the Senate floor for a vote.296  Coburn objected to
the bill on the ground that it increased government spending too
much and did not adequately protect the rights of people, particularly
military veterans, unfairly tagged as having a mental problem, or who
seek to have their gun rights restored after recovering from a mental
illness.297  Proponents of the legislation eventually reached a compro-
mise with Coburn on amendments to the bill.298  The Senate and
House quickly passed the revised bill,299 and President Bush signed it
into law in January 2008.300
The Act requires states to provide information for NICS about
people prohibited from having guns, including people disqualified as
a result of having been adjudicated mentally defective or committed
to a mental institution.301  To encourage states to comply with those
obligations, the Act also contains a set of financial carrots and sticks.
It makes a total of $1.3125 billion in federal grants available over five
years to states for purposes of improving their maintenance and provi-
sion of records for NICS purposes.302  After a three-year grace period,
a state not providing NICS a sufficient portion of its relevant records
293. See 153 CONG. REC. H6347 (daily ed. June 13, 2007).
294. Paul denounced the bill as a “flagrantly unconstitutional” violation of Second
Amendment and privacy rights. See 153 CONG. REC. H6345 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (state-
ment of Rep. Paul).  Other critics of the compromise legislation include the American
Psychiatric Association, which denounced the proposal for stigmatizing mentally ill people.
See Michael Isikoff, Taking Aim at Mental Health Records, NEWSWEEK/MSNBC.COM, Apr. 24,
2007.
295. Editorial, As the Shock of Virginia Tech Fades, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007, at A26
(describing how a “lone obdurate lawmaker” blocked Senate passage of the bill).
296. Elizabeth Williamson, Oklahoma Senator Blocks Widely Accepted Gun Bill, WASH. POST,
Oct. 3, 2007, at A5.
297. Id.
298. Elizabeth Williamson & Brigid Schulte, Congress Passes Bill to Stop Mentally Ill from
Getting Guns, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2007, at A12.
299. The Senate passed the bill by unanimous consent, 153 CONG. REC. S15971 (daily
ed. Dec. 19, 2007), and the House of Representatives accepted the Senate’s amended ver-
sion of the bill by unanimous consent later the same day, 153 CONG. REC. H16926 (daily
ed. Dec. 19, 2007).
300. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, 122 Stat. 2559
(2008).
301. Id. § 102(c), 122 Stat. at 2566–67.
302. Id. §§ 103(e), 301(e), 122 Stat. at 2568, 2571.
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would become subject to penalties in the form of cuts to federal fund-
ing of the state’s law enforcement.303
The NRA negotiated for addition of several provisions limiting
the category of people disqualified from having guns because of
mental illness.304  Under current law, a person adjudicated mentally
defective or committed to a mental institution is forever thereafter
prohibited from having a gun.305  The NICS improvement bill, how-
ever, provides for “relief from disabilities” programs through which a
person can have a disqualification lifted under certain circumstances,
such as if a person’s adjudication or commitment has been set aside, a
person has been found to have recovered from mental illness, or a
person has been released from all treatment and supervision.306
Largely to protect military veterans diagnosed as mentally ill for pur-
poses of Veterans Administration disability benefits, the bill also in-
cludes a provision to block federal agencies from including anyone in
the database “based solely on a medical finding of disability, without
an opportunity for a hearing by a court, board, commission, or other
lawful authority.”307
Legislators on both sides of the gun debate hailed the NICS Im-
provement Amendments Act as the sort of valuable compromise that
could be achieved to break the usual political stalemate over gun is-
sues.308  Reflecting on the legislation’s passage, Representative McCar-
thy said it was “a proud moment for the American people to see how
we can work together,” and expressed hope that “down the road I can
continue to work with the NRA and continue working with the Brady
Center [to Prevent Gun Violence] to come up with commonsense so-
lutions on how we can save lives.”309
303. Id. § 104(b), 122 Stat. at 2568–69.
304. See Press Release, NRA-ILA, Senate Passes NICS Improvement Act, House Concurs
(Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.nraila.org/Legislation/Federal/Read.aspx?id=3321.
305. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000).
306. Pub. L. No. 110-180, §§ 101(c), 103(c), 105, 122 Stat. 2559, 2562–64, 2568,
2569–70.
307. Id. § 101(c)(1)(C), 122 Stat. at 2562; 153 CONG. REC. H12351-52 (daily ed. Oct. 31,
2007) (statement of Rep. McCarthy).
308. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. H6343 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Rep. Castle)
(calling the legislation a “true compromise”); id. at 6343–44 (statement of Rep. Dingell)
(expressing excitement that both sides support a worthy goal); id. at 6344, 6346 (state-
ments of Rep. Lungren) (acknowledging relief that extraneous arguments did not side-
track legislators in creating the bill).
309. 153 CONG. REC. H16927 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007); Op-Ed., Gun Control; Gun-Rights
and Gun-Control Advocates Can Find Common Ground in Senate, MORNING CALL (Allentown,
Pa.), June 19, 2007, at A8 (quoting Sen. Charles Schumer as saying, “The fact that the NRA
and I agree shows that this legislation is needed, not controversial and should pass
quickly”).
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Meanwhile, an even greater problem lurks in the heart of the
background check system, untouched by the NICS Improvement
Amendments Act.  Federal law requires background checks only for
sales of guns by licensed dealers engaged in the business of selling
firearms, and not for the enormous number of other “private” or “sec-
ondary market” transfers that occur every day.310  Several states, such
as California and Pennsylvania, have expanded their background
check requirements to cover all transfers of firearms.311  However,
most states, including Virginia, have not, allowing a person who fails a
background check at a gun store to obtain a gun simply by purchasing
one from a friend, co-worker, neighbor, a stranger on the street, at a
gun show, or through a classified ad in the local newspaper.312  Esti-
mates indicate that as many as half of all gun transactions in America
occur in the unregulated, or “secondary,” market.313
The NRA and its allies do not regard this as an inadvertent loop-
hole.  Instead, this limitation on the background check system is
something they favor and fight to preserve.314  They steadfastly oppose
310. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) (requiring licensed importers, manufacturers, and dealers to
perform background checks before completing transfers of firearms).
311. See LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA: AN EVALU-
ATION AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL, STATE AND SELECTED LOCAL GUN LAWS 100
(2006), available at http://www.lcav.org/library/reports_analyses/National_Audit_Total_
8.16.06.pdf (identifying California and Pennsylvania among the states that have eliminated
the “secondary market” loophole).
312. Brian J. Siebel, City Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Roadmap for Reforming Gun
Industry Misconduct, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 247, 270, 275 (1999); see also James D.
Wright, Ten Essential Observations on Guns in America, SOCIETY, Mar. 1995, at 63, 65 (explain-
ing that criminals can obtain guns “by informal swaps, trades, and purchases among family
members, friends, acquaintances, and street and black-market sources”).
313. JAMES B. JACOBS, CAN GUN CONTROL WORK? 134 (2002); see also Philip J. Cook &
Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: National Survey on Private Ownership and Use of Firearms, NAT’L
INST. JUST.: RESEARCH IN BRIEF, May 1997, at 6, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/
165476.pdf (estimating that forty percent of guns, or about two million guns per year, are
acquired in “off-the-books transfers in the secondary market”); Philip J. Cook et al., Regulat-
ing Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 69–70 (1995) (finding data supportive of
the conclusions that about half of all gun sales involve used guns and that about forty
percent occur in secondary rather than regulated markets).
314. See Siebel, supra note 312, at 270–71 (stating that the gun industry and the NRA are R
heavily responsible for constraining the government’s ability to regulate the illegal gun
market); Stop Handgun Violence, The Smoking Gun: The NRA Admits It Does Not Support Crimi-
nal Background Checks for All Gun Sales; Association Also Supports Loophole Allowing Suspected
Terrorists to Purchase Guns Without Identification or Background Check, BUS. WIRE, July 24, 2007,
available at http://home.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=
news_view&newsId=20070724006046&newsLang=en (discussing areas that the NRA be-
lieves should remain unregulated).
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the background check system being implemented in a comprehensive
way that would allow it to more fully perform its intended function.315
As a result, it is unclear how many people who fail background
checks are actually prevented from obtaining guns, and how many ul-
timately acquire them from unlicensed sources.316  In other words,
nearly half of America’s gun sales are not covered by background
checks, and it is unclear how effective such a partial policy can be.
Indeed, it is impossible to know what would have happened if
Seung-Hui Cho failed background checks when he attempted to
purchase guns through licensed dealers.  He was apparently a very
anti-social loner,317 and it is not clear that he had access to guns
through any friends or family, or had familiarity with any other
sources of firearms.  On the other hand, he may well have been deter-
mined enough to seek out guns from an unlicensed seller at a gun
show or elsewhere.  We will never know, but it remains possible that
Cho would have slipped past the partial roadblock of the existing
background check system even if the NICS databases had been kept
perfectly up to date with all relevant records.  In other words, the en-
hancements of record gathering promised by the NICS Improvement
Amendments Act are a valuable effort and a sensible response to the
Virginia Tech shootings, but it is unclear whether they in fact would
have prevented that tragedy from occurring.
IV. TOWARD MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE POLICYMAKING
ON GUNS
A common thread runs through all of these recent major contro-
versies in the gun control arena, with each reflecting the problems
created by implementing gun policy in an incremental, piecemeal
fashion.  First and most obviously, each of the controversies involves
315. That does not necessarily stop them from attacking the current background check
system for being ineffective because it does not cover all gun sales. See, e.g., Press Release,
Gun Owners of America, Your Gun Rights Could Soon Hang in the Balance—VA Tech
Shootings Now Spurring the Most Far-reaching Gun Control in a Decade (Apr. 23, 2007),
http://www.gunowners.org/a042307.htm (arguing that “[b]ackground checks DO NOT
ULTIMATELY STOP criminals and mental wackos from getting guns,” and citing the ex-
ample of a neo-Nazi who went on a shooting spree with guns he bought through an unli-
censed seller’s newspaper advertisements after failing a background check at a licensed
gun store).
316. Wright, supra note 312, at 66. R
317. See Natasha Altamirano & Seth McLaughlin, Fairfax Man Identified as Tech Shooter;
English Major ‘Loner’ Wrote Upsetting Stories, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2007, at A1 (describing
Cho as a “loner”); Brigid Schulte & Tim Craig, Unknown to Va. Tech, Cho Had a Disorder;
Fairfax Helped Student Cope with Anxiety, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2007, at A1 (noting that Cho
was “unable to speak in social settings”).
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an attempt to create special “gun-free zones,” whether it is in the New
Orleans area in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,318 in
the District of Columbia,319 or on the campuses of universities like
Virginia Tech.320  In each instance, the goal is to carve out a limited
area in which guns will be either completely prohibited or heavily re-
stricted, with the hope of creating a haven safer than areas in which
no special restrictions on guns are in force.
The objective is commendable.  The dilemma, of course, is that
the relatively lax controls on guns in other areas undermine the ef-
fort.  No one can ensure that a college campus, let alone a sprawling
urban region like New Orleans or the District of Columbia, will re-
main truly “gun-free” when guns are so numerous and loosely con-
trolled in surrounding areas.321
Little or no controversy surrounds the creation of gun-free zones
in circumstances where security personnel are present and entrants
are searched or screened for weapons, such as within courthouses or
the “sterile” areas of airports.322  In those contexts, the promise of a
gun-free zone can be fully achieved.  By contrast, the borders of a city
or a university campus are too vulnerable to achieve complete success
in eliminating guns.  That distinction is overlooked, for example,
when members of Congress seeking to repeal the District of Colum-
bia’s gun laws are accused of hypocrisy because they would leave in
place the laws prohibiting guns within the United States Capitol build-
ing.323  A gun-free zone with a tightly secured perimeter is quite differ-
ent from a gun-free zone with no border security of any sort.
Regulating guns thus presents the same sort of special difficulties
as policymaking in other contexts where the effectiveness of incre-
mental approaches may be limited.  Just as aggressive desegregation
318. See supra Part I.A.
319. See supra Part I.B.
320. See supra Part I.C.
321. See supra notes 217–229 and accompanying text. R
322. See, e.g., Daniel C. Vock & Pauline Vu, Va. Tech Shooting Inspires First Legislation,
STATELINE.ORG, Apr. 18, 2007, http://www.stateline.org/live/printable/story?contentId=
199731 (“If the university is able to protect [students and others on campus], I have no
problem with them banning guns. . . .  To adequately protect students, universities would
have to add more police and screen visitors for weapons as airports and courthouses
do . . . .”) (quoting Utah State Republican Sen. Michael G. Waddoups) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
323. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. H7775 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Slaughter) (labeling as hypocritical a repeal of the ban on guns in the District of Columbia
that does not affect the prohibition of guns in certain government buildings); id. at 7742
(statement of Rep. McGovern) (noting that the debated bill to repeal D.C.’s gun ban
would not repeal the ban on guns in the Capitol, thus “approv[ing] guns in another per-
son’s workplace in the District but not in our offices”).
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efforts instituted in one district may be undercut by “white flight” to
surrounding areas,324 attempts to carve out special gun-free zones may
be undermined by movement of guns.  Just as allowing local experi-
mentation with varying degrees of environmental protection may
threaten everyone in a state with all of its water resources in a large
lake or river,325 states with weaker gun laws become the source of
weapons that flow into and undermine the laws of states opting for
tighter legal controls on access to guns.  In the political scientists’
terms, the gun issue is “characterized by causal chains elongated in
space,” thus the uniquely tough gun laws in one place can be under-
cut by the very fact that they are unique and not in force in all
areas.326  Data on traces of guns recovered by law enforcement con-
firm that the volume of guns imported into a state is “closely linked to
the stringency of local firearm controls,” or, in other words, that large
numbers of guns sold in states with weak laws wind up in places with
stricter controls.327
This is not necessarily to say that particularly strict regulations of
guns, like the laws on the books in the District of Columbia or the
rules against guns on many college campuses, are on balance bad poli-
cies.  One can reasonably argue that, even if they are not perfect, and
the ideal of truly gun-free zones cannot be achieved, these policies still
have merit.  For example, even though the District of Columbia con-
tinues to have significant problems with guns, its laws may reduce to
some extent the number of firearms available to be criminally or acci-
dentally misused.  As discussed above, criminologists disagree about
what the empirical evidence ultimately shows about the net effect of
the District’s gun laws on homicide and suicide rates.328  Likewise,
banning guns at colleges and universities surely saves some lives by
reducing to some extent the number of firearms in an environment
where binge drinking, drug abuse, youthful recklessness, fighting, de-
pression, and suicide are ever-present problems.329
324. See supra notes 39–51 and accompanying text. R
325. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. R
326. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 215–224 and accompa- R
nying text.
327. Philip J. Cook & Anthony A. Braga, Comprehensive Firearms Tracing: Strategic and In-
vestigative Uses of New Data on Firearms Markets, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 277, 298–99 (2001); cf.
JACOBS, supra note 313, at 224 (arguing that gun policies should be made at the local level R
but acknowledging that this “decentralized gun regulation according to local preference
allows negative externalities” because one jurisdiction’s restrictions may be undermined by
another’s lax controls).
328. See supra notes 199–210 and accompanying text. R
329. See LEGAL ACTION PROJECT, supra note 269, at 6–9 (arguing that allowing gun pos- R
session on college campuses would pose multiple risks given college students’ drug and
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In assessing their merits, however, the proponents of creating
these sorts of gun-free zones should be much more cognizant of the
complexities and challenges presented by trying to implement gun
regulation in such a spatially incremental manner.  Prohibiting guns
and thereby reducing but not totally eliminating their presence in an
area may have benefits, but it may have costs as well.  Guns can be
used to do good things as well as bad; they can be used to save lives as
well as to take them.  Evaluating the overall effects of a policy like a
city-wide or campus-wide ban on guns therefore is an enormously
complicated enterprise, and gun control advocates must be cautious
not to assume too hastily or dogmatically that implementing strict gun
laws in limited areas is better than nothing.  What would be optimal
policy on a worldwide or nationwide scale may be poor policy for one
college, city, or state to implement by itself.  Again, people can reason-
ably disagree about the net effect and overall virtues of the District of
Columbia laws, college gun bans, and various other similar measures
now in place, but there can be no doubt that the geographically incre-
mental nature of this sort of policymaking approach limits its effec-
tiveness to some extent.
Gun control advocates are not the only ones often guilty of pay-
ing too little attention to the special perils of making regulatory policy
for guns in an incremental manner.  The NRA and its allies have con-
tinually fought hard to limit the nation’s most important gun control
measures in ways that significantly reduce their effectiveness.330  The
fact that background checks apply only to sales by licensed dealers is a
glaring recent example,331 but this sort of policymaking, in which a
restriction on guns is imposed but undermined by its conspicuous in-
completeness, is not a new phenomenon.  It has been a pattern re-
peated many times over the past century.  For example, among the
earliest federal gun control enactments was the Mailing of Firearms
Act of 1927,332 which prohibited interstate mail-order purchases of
handguns but applied only to shipments by the United States Postal
Service.  The ban could be avoided simply by shipping the handguns
through a private package delivery company such as United Parcel
Service.333  Another egregious example was the Gun Control Act of
alcohol use, mental vulnerabilities, and the likelihood that guns on college campuses
could be easily stolen).
330. See supra note 314 and accompanying text. R
331. See supra notes 310–316 and accompanying text. R
332. Act of Feb. 8, 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-583, 44 Stat. 1059 (1927) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1715 (2000)).
333. Zimring, supra note 170, at 136. R
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1968’s ban on imports of small, inexpensive, low-quality handguns.334
By cutting off imports of these guns from abroad while imposing no
restrictions on their domestic manufacture, the legislation gave birth
to a set of new U.S. manufacturers soon churning out enormous quan-
tities of small, cheap “Saturday Night Special” pistols.335
Politics explains in part this frustrating pattern of repeatedly en-
acting gun control measures that are too limited to accomplish fully
their objectives.  Gun control is such a controversial issue that com-
promises and bargains must be struck to get anything enacted, and
sometimes those deals result in misshaped legislation.  The aggrega-
tion of disparate interests through the political process can produce
legislation drawing lines and distinctions otherwise lacking any ra-
tional explanation.  For example, the ban on foreign imports of cheap
handguns became law in 1968 because it had the enthusiastic support
of the U.S. gun industry (as a protectionist measure) as well as the
support of gun control advocates.336  A few years later, without the
gun makers and their allies in Congress on board, attempts to extend
the same restrictions to domestically manufactured handguns
failed.337  Other major pieces of gun control legislation, from the Na-
tional Firearms Act of 1934338  to the Brady Handgun Violence Pre-
vention Act of 1993,339 have undergone significant hacking and
twisting to gain majority support as they moved through Congress.340
The shortsighted enactment of incomplete measures has also oc-
curred in part because gun control legislation has so often been the
334. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 925(d)(3), 82 Stat. 1213, 1225
(1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 925(d)(3) (2000)) (banning imports of handguns not
“generally recognized as particularly suitable for or readily adaptable to sporting pur-
poses”); Zimring, supra note 170, at 154–57, 163–65 (describing ATF’s implementation of R
the 1968 import restriction).
335. See Holly Yeager, Guns in America; Cheap Guns Flow from a Few Factories to Many Crime
Scenes, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 20, 1997, at A15 (describing how a 1968 gun control law effec-
tively insulated domestic manufacturers of small handguns from “foreign competition”).
336. See Dave Kopel & Paul Blackman, Op-Ed., City Council v. NRA; New York Likes Repub-
lican Money, but not Republican Values, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 30, 2004, http://www.
nationalreview.com/comment/kopel_blackman200408300841.asp (noting how gun mak-
ers pushed legislation to block imports of inexpensive guns); see also Zimring, supra note
170, at 155–56 (analyzing the degree to which legislation impeding importation of cheap R
guns was a protectionist measure, while at the same time suggesting that Congress’s im-
plicit goal in passing the legislation “was to reduce access to guns for high-risk groups”).
337. See Zimring, supra note 170, at 171–73 (discussing the failure of proposals to extend R
such regulation to domestic guns).
338. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801–72 (2000).
339. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
340. For an overview of the history of the major federal enactments relating to guns, see
generally ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 109–41 (3d ed. 2004).
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product of acute surges of concern or prominent tragedies.  Congress
passed the National Firearms Act of 1934 amid widespread fear of
gangsterism, fueled by sensational media reports, and in the wake of
an anarchist’s failed attempt to assassinate President-elect Franklin
Roosevelt.341  The assassinations of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.
and Senator Robert Kennedy led to passage of the Gun Control Act of
1968.342  Rather than seeking to fashion proposals that comprehen-
sively address a problem, legislators often rushed to patch whatever
hole in gun laws seemed to be responsible for the most recent tragic
incident.  Lee Harvey Oswald purchased his rifle through the mail,
thus legislators proposed bans on mail-order firearm sales.343  The two
students who carried out the deadly shooting spree at Columbine
High School in 1999 obtained one of their weapons through a gun
show, thus expanding background check requirements at gun shows
became the focus of post-Columbine legislative activity.344  This pat-
tern of limited and specific responses to particular tragedies continues
to this day, with Congress’s reaction to the Virginia Tech shootings as
the most recent example.345
The incrementalist model of policymaking thus provides a way of
understanding and assessing many of the difficulties that have
plagued development of gun laws in the United States.  Congress en-
acted a series of measures that gradually increased controls on fire-
arms.  Those federal provisions lay on top of a wide array of state and
local measures, forming a confusing and unfinished mosaic in which
many odd lines have been drawn and significant gaps in coverage re-
main.  America’s gun laws evolved in small and varying steps over time
without coalescing into a sound and coherent whole.
This is particularly troublesome with respect to guns because of
the central role that “slippery slope” concerns play in inflaming the
debate over firearm regulations.346  Polls suggest that about half the
341. See Greg S. Weaver, Firearm Deaths, Gun Availability, and Legal Regulatory Changes:
Suggestions from the Data, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 823, 824 (2002).
342. SPITZER, supra note 340, at 87, 113. R
343. Id. at 87.
344. See JACOBS, supra note 313, at 129. R
345. See supra Part II.C.
346. See JACOBS, supra note 313, at 221 (describing gun owners’ resolve to resist all gun R
controls to avoid going down “a path to involuntary disarmament”); Don B. Kates, Jr.,
Public Opinion: The Effects of Extremist Discourse on the Gun Debate, in THE GREAT AMERICAN
GUN DEBATE 93, 99–100 (Don B. Kates, Jr. & Gary Kleck eds., 1997) (arguing that the gun
control debate has been dominated by “extreme views” and that gun owners have been
mobilized by a fear that every gun control measure is “a further step toward the
hatemongers’ ultimate goal of banning and confiscating all guns”); Gary Kleck, Absolutist
Politics in a Moderate Package: Prohibitionist Intentions of the Gun Control Movement, 13 J. FIRE-
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country believes even modest gun control measures will lead to pro-
gressively stricter laws and eventual confiscation of all guns.347  The
idea that politicians and organizations calling for gun control ulti-
mately want to prohibit all guns is an article of faith among hardcore
advocates of gun rights.348  Incremental implementation of increas-
ingly strict regulatory controls on guns inevitably pours fuel on these
fears.349  That is particularly true when governments adopt gun con-
trol measures that are incomplete in their coverage in crucial respects.
For example, many gun owners see that the federal background check
laws leave gaping holes by affecting only sales by licensed dealers and
ignoring black-market and other secondary sales.350  Rather than see-
ing such laws as well-intentioned but limited measures, many gun own-
ers conclude that the laws cannot truly be aimed at criminals and
instead must be meant to harass law-abiding gun purchasers and lay
the groundwork for future bans and confiscations of guns.351
For many other policy issues, incrementalism would not pose this
problem.  If government agencies develop safety standards for auto-
mobiles, for example, by tinkering with existing regulations and mak-
ing an endless series of small, new policy changes until they get just
the right results, few Americans would see this as terrifying proof that
the government is secretly determined to ban and confiscate all cars.
With respect to guns, however, slippery slope concerns are widespread
and intense, and it is crucial for policymaking on guns to be handled
in ways that do not unnecessarily exacerbate those fears.
The flip side of the “slippery slope” problem is the danger that
adoption of an array of incomplete measures saps support for gun
control among those otherwise favoring it.  Sociologist and philoso-
pher Herbert Marcuse is among those who have described how gov-
ernment programs often go just far enough to suppress support for
ARMS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2001) (describing gun control opponents’ consistent use of slip-
pery slope arguments in fighting gun control); Rostron, supra note 158, at 1459–60 R
(describing various slippery slope arguments in the gun context and noting that gun con-
trol advocates “must be attentive to those slippery slope concerns and cannot cavalierly
dismiss them”).
347. See Kleck, supra note 346, at 32 (discussing a 1978 national survey finding that fifty- R
one percent of U.S. adults fear that a national registration program could lead to gun
confiscation).
348. Rostron, supra note 158, at 1460 (describing the widespread conviction among gun R
owners and organizations like the NRA “that every gun control proposal is part of a grand
scheme to eliminate all civilian access to guns”).
349. See Kleck, supra note 346, at 2–4. R
350. Wright, supra note 312, at 66. R
351. See id. (noting gun owners’ fears that gun registration and permit requirements are
“intended primarily to keep tabs on them”).
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more comprehensive and effective reforms.352  For example, he con-
tends that the welfare system “provides the minimal amount of bene-
fits to keep its recipients from revolution, yet never enough to make
educational or social advancement possible.”353  Likewise, the existing
gun laws are enough to reassure many people that something is being
done, thereby defusing pressure for larger steps to be taken.  Indeed,
one of the arguments invariably invoked against passage of any new
gun control measure is the apocryphal claim that there are already
more than 20,000 gun laws on the books in the United States.354  If all
those laws have not made us safe, the argument goes, enacting one
more law surely will not make a difference.  The end result is that
most of the public is skeptical of the effectiveness of gun control laws
even while it favors their adoption.355
To avoid the problems posed by controls implemented in incom-
plete, piecemeal ways, it is not necessary to go to the extreme of either
completely banning guns or having no regulation of them at all.356
Instead, policymakers should be striving harder to ensure that
352. See Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81, 81
(Robert Paul Wolff et al. eds., 1969) (presenting the theory that tolerance effectively serves
the cause of oppression); Nancy Levit, Expediting Death: Repressive Tolerance and Post-
Conviction Due Process Jurisprudence in Capital Cases, 59 UMKC L. REV. 55, 56–58 (1990) (ex-
plaining Marcuse’s theory of repressive tolerance and describing one form of such toler-
ance as when “government programs are made just palatable enough that their oppressive
aspects are tolerated”).
353. Levit, supra note 352, at 57. R
354. Rep. John Dingell apparently invented the “20,000 gun laws” argument during con-
gressional testimony in 1965, and it has since been repeated countless times in arguments
against gun control.  Jon S. Vernick & Lisa M. Hepburn, State and Federal Gun Laws: Trends
for 1970–99, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME & VIOLENCE 345, 361–62 (Jens
Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003); see, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. 8271 (2000) (statement of
Sen. Craig); 145 CONG. REC. 13090 (1999) (statement of Rep. Linder); 140 CONG. REC.
9380 (1994) (statement of Rep. Packard); 137 CONG. REC. 16918 (1991) (statement of Sen.
Hatch); 131 CONG. REC. 7582 (1985) (statement of Rep. Cobey).  A few months after his
attempted assassination in 1981, President Reagan denied the need for additional gun
legislation on the ground that “[t]here are today more than 20,000 gun control laws in
effect—federal, state, and local—in the United States.” ‘I Have Recovered,’ President Declares,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1981, at A27.  A lively debate exists about whether the 20,000 figure is
accurate or meaningful. See, e.g., Vernick & Hepburn, supra, at 362–63 (questioning the
accuracy of the 20,000 figure and noting its rhetorical importance in the gun control de-
bate); Michael L. Betsch, Gun Control Group’s Statistical Study Called ‘A Waste of Time,’ CYBER-
CAST NEWS SERV., Jan. 27, 2003, http://www.cnsnews.com/Culture/Archive/200301/
CUL20030127a.html (discussing gun rights advocates’ reaction to a study by a liberal think
tank calling into question the accuracy of the 20,000 figure).
355. See Kates, supra note 348, at 93–95.
356. For the contrary view that any gun control measure short of absolute elimination of
all guns will be counterproductive, see Daniel D. Polsby, Equal Protection, REASON, Oct.
1993, at 34, and Daniel D. Polsby, The False Promise of Gun Control, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1994, at 57.
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whatever restrictions they put on guns are not limited in arbitrary or
unreasonable ways that undercut their effectiveness.
Transforming the current background check requirements into a
more comprehensive and stronger system should be a high priority.
As one member of Congress put it in the debates after the Virginia
Tech shootings, “if we are going to have a background check system,
we ought to do it right.”357  Background checks should be required
for all acquisitions of firearms, not just purchases from licensed deal-
ers.  A system of licensing gun owners and registering firearms would
be the ideal means of facilitating and ensuring compliance with the
background check requirement.  Safety training and a thorough back-
ground check could be prerequisites for the licenses.  Registration of
firearms would permit quick and reliable tracing of guns used in
crimes, giving everyone a strong incentive to comply with the back-
ground check rules.358  In other words, if you wanted to sell a gun to a
neighbor, you would have every reason to ensure that he was licensed
and legally qualified to have the gun so that you could update the
registration and later prove easily that you no longer had the gun if it
turned up in connection with a shooting or other unsavory incident.
Opinion polls suggest that most Americans, even most gun own-
ers, support the movement to this sort of sensible, more comprehen-
sive system of controls over firearms.359  Several states already require
background checks for all transfers of guns, and some have varying
forms of licensing and registration requirements, demonstrating the
feasibility of these measures.360  If implemented on a nationwide basis,
357. 153 CONG. REC. H6345 (daily ed. June 13, 2007) (statement of Rep. McCaul).
358. See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Principles for Effective Gun Policy, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 589, 604–05 (2004) (discussing how improvements to the gun registration and tracing
system could help law enforcement identify and punish individuals who commit gun
crimes).  Bills providing for establishment of a nationwide licensing and registration system
have been introduced occasionally in Congress but have never made any significant pro-
gress toward passage. See, e.g., Blair Holt’s Firearm Licensing & Record of Sale Act of 2007,
H.R. 2666, 110th Cong. (2007) (last action, referred to the House Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security on July 16, 2007).
359. For example, a 2001 survey found high levels of support for requiring background
checks, licensing, and registration for all handgun purchases, even among survey respon-
dents who described themselves as NRA supporters.  Press Release, Educational Fund to
Stop Gun Violence, New Poll Finds American Voters Overwhelmingly Support Handgun
Licensing and Registration, Criminal Background Checks (June 12, 2001), available at
http://www.commondreams.org/news2001/0612-05.htm; see also Stephen P. Teret et al.,
Support for New Policies to Regulate Firearms: Results of Two National Surveys, 339 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 813, 816 (1998) (describing survey results indicating that 77% of Americans favor
requiring background checks for private sales of firearms, 82% support mandatory registra-
tion of handguns, and 63% want registration of long guns).
360. LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra note 311, at 71–72, 112–31. R
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the effectiveness of this sort of scheme would be far greater than what
scattered cities, counties, or states acting on their own can achieve.
Moreover, these measures would be carefully targeted against poten-
tial criminals, seeking to disarm only those already prohibited by law
from having guns, and not interfering with gun acquisition or posses-
sion by qualified, law-abiding individuals.361  Even researchers gener-
ally pessimistic about the effectiveness of gun control have recognized
that
[t]here do appear to be some gun controls which work, all of
them relatively moderate, popular, and inexpensive.  Thus,
there is support for a gun control policy organized around
gun owner licensing or purchase permits (or some other
form of gun buyer screening), stricter local dealer licensing,
bans on possession of guns by criminals and mentally ill peo-
ple, stronger controls over illegal carrying, and possibly dis-
cretionary add-on penalties for committing felonies with a
gun.362
Fear of the slippery slope is undoubtedly the primary obstacle to
adoption of this sort of comprehensive national system.363  Registra-
tion of firearms, in particular, would be regarded by some as merely a
prelude to a dreaded ban and confiscation of all firearms.  At the mo-
ment, NRA opposition and the low ebb of politicians’ interest in gun
control would render unrealistic a dramatic reform of the background
check system into a comprehensive and far more effective control.364
That might change if the proposal could be paired with measures
giving substantial benefits and reassurance to the gun rights side of
the debate.  Again, the issue of “gun free zones” looms large in every
one of the recent major controversies surrounding guns.  Bans or se-
vere restrictions on guns remain in place in a smattering of limited
areas such as the District of Columbia and college campuses.  Mean-
while, virtually all states have moved toward allowing qualified people
to obtain permits to carry concealed guns, but the standards gov-
361. See Robert Taylor, A Game Theoretic Model of Gun Control, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
269 (1995) (formulating game theory models to suggest that background checks, licensing,
and registration requirements would be the most effective gun control strategies because
they impose heavy costs on potential criminals and only modest costs on those who obtain
guns for legitimate defensive purposes).
362. Gary Kleck & E. Britt Patterson, The Impact of Gun Control and Gun Ownership Levels
on Violence Rates, 9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 249, 283 (1993).
363. See supra notes 346–351 and accompanying text. R
364. Current conventional wisdom says that Democrats have been hurt politically for
supporting gun control and now shy away from the issue. See, e.g., Alex Koppelman, Why
Democrats Dumped Gun Control, SALON, Apr. 18, 2007, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/
2007/04/18/dems_and_guns/index.html.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 57 28-APR-08 7:13
2008] THE FUTURE OF GUN CONTROL 567
erning those permits vary tremendously from state to state, as do the
rules on recognition of out-of-state permits.365  Passing a federal law to
ensure nationwide reciprocity for the permits, therefore, has become
a primary objective for the NRA.366
Combining these issues into one major overhaul of the nation’s
firearm laws might attract support from both sides of the gun debate.
It would mean taking several different types of gun control measures
that have been implemented in limited form and paring back some
while letting others achieve full flower.  A comprehensive system of
background checks, licensing, and registration would finally be
achieved.  At the same time, the ability of qualified citizens to carry
concealed guns would be expanded and standardized throughout the
nation, not only enhancing the odds of guns being used for socially
beneficial purposes, but also providing reassurances that the controls
imposed on guns are genuinely meant to promote safety and not to
pave the way for gun confiscation.  The political impasse over gun reg-
ulation would be broken, as would America’s unfortunate pattern of
regulating guns in incremental, piecemeal ways that leave us with a set
of partial measures too easily undermined by their limited reach.
V. CONCLUSION
What good is half an eye?  Is half a loaf better than none?  These
questions must be carefully considered if the United States is to make
progress toward more effective policymaking, or even a more rea-
soned, constructive debate about guns.  As illustrated by the recent
major controversies concerning guns, from Hurricane Katrina to Vir-
ginia Tech, regulation of guns has too often been done in a piece-
meal, incomplete way that has undermined its effectiveness and left
no one content.  While an incremental approach may be an effective
or even ideal way to deal with many other problems, it will continue to
pose serious problems when applied to the regulation of guns.  People
on every side of the gun control debate must take into account the
possibility that policies partially but not completely addressing a
targeted problem may achieve the worst results, whether it is gun con-
365. See LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra note 311, at 132–42 (providing a R
summary of the various state and local carrying concealed weapons laws); Ryan S. Andrus,
Note, The Concealed Handgun Debate and the Need for State-to-State Concealed Handgun Permit
Reciprocity, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 129, 130 (2000) (describing three general categories of con-
cealed carry statutes).
366. See NRA-ILA, The Stearns/Boucher Right-to-Carry Reciprocity Bill (Apr. 26, 2007),
http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/Read.aspx?ID=189 (supporting a bill requiring
states to recognize carry permits from other states).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-3\MLR301.txt unknown Seq: 58 28-APR-08 7:13
568 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:511
trol advocates pushing for creation of “gun free zones” too easily un-
dermined by the ubiquity of firearms throughout the remainder of
society, or gun rights advocates purporting to support moderate con-
trols like background checks but insisting on preserving limitations
and loopholes destined to doom the enterprise.
Giving up is not the answer.  After every high-profile shooting,
some critics of gun control efforts insist that nothing could have been
done to prevent the attack.  For example, while supporting improve-
ments to the background check system after the Virginia Tech shoot-
ings, the NRA repeatedly emphasized that in its view “no piece of
legislation will stop a madman bent on committing horrific crimes.”367
As Tulane law professor Stephen Griffin observed on a blog just a
few hours after the shootings at Virginia Tech, the phrase “you can’t
prevent something like this” is “surely one of the most demoralizing
and misleading memes ever released into the public sphere.”368  “If it
is reasonable to act to prevent terrorism,” Griffin wrote, “it is reasona-
ble to make every effort to make sure that nothing like this ever hap-
pens again.”369  Indeed, Americans surely would have reacted with
disgust if Congress had responded to the terrorist attacks on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, by announcing that it would not be doing anything to try
to make the nation safer because no piece of legislation will stop
madmen bent on committing horrific crimes against us.
Reasonable efforts should be made to reduce gun violence, but
those efforts should push toward a comprehensive and cohesive pat-
tern of controls, rather than a crazy quilt of inconsistent and incom-
plete measures.  Suddenly grabbing guns in the midst of a crisis, as
New Orleans police announced they would do during Hurricane Ka-
trina, is an overreaching reaction too late and too haphazard to
achieve any significant benefits.  Trying to carve out a small haven
with extremely restrictive gun laws, as in the District of Columbia, will
be frustrated to a substantial extent by the easy availability of guns
from surrounding areas with weaker laws.  Gaps in coverage and im-
plementation will prevent potentially sound policies like background
check requirements from fully achieving their objectives, as the Vir-
367. NRA-ILA, H.R. 2640, the “NICS Improvement Act,” Passes House by Voice Vote,
June 15, 2007, http://www.nraila.org/Legislation/Read.aspx?ID=3112; see also NRA-ILA,
NRA Statement on Legislative Efforts on Capitol Hill (Apr. 27, 2007), http://www.nraila.
org/Legislation/Federal/Read.aspx?id=2921 (“Including necessary records on prohibited
persons into the NICS is a position we have long supported.  However, history has shown
that no law will stop a madman intent on doing evil.”).
368. Posting of Stephen Griffin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/04/
you-cant-prevent-something-like-this.html (Apr. 16, 2007, 18:52 EST).
369. Id.
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ginia Tech shootings tragically demonstrated.  After years of incre-
mental development of regulations on guns, America needs to make a
leap forward toward a comprehensive approach that will do more to
keep guns out of the wrong hands.
